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ABSTRACT
In three chapters I study the formation of social networks, and the impact the structures
that arise may have in various economic settings. First, I develop a model of social network
formation with heterogeneous agents and incomplete information. The model predicts an
equilibrium in which agents sort themselves into “insiders” and “outsiders.” Insiders form
many links to one another, and form a dense core structure in the network, while outsiders
coordinate their links by connecting to an insider, and form a sparse periphery . Networks
form stochastically, contingent on the private values of each agent, and include more re-
alistic structures than networks arising among homogenous agents. I characterize the set
of equilibria and identify its extremes, which have a natural interpretation as public good
provision. One extreme, when agents are all insiders, is equivalent to the provision of a pure
public good, and suffers from free-riding. The other extreme, when every agent but one is
an outsider, the equilibrium is equivalent to the provision of an excludable public good, and
suffers from coordination problems.
I next develop expand this model to study the provision local public goods, such as in-
formation, that is shared along the network. Individuals may choose to provide a public
good that is not excludable among their peers in a social network. The network is formed
endogenously, as agents non-cooperatively choose their social ties. I characterize the set of
equilibria, and examine the relationship between public good provision and social network
formation. I find that the architecture of the social network determines the strategic in-
teraction between link formation and public good provision; for some networks, links are
strategic substitutes, so that agents attempt to free-ride on their peer’s links. This leads to
higher levels of public good provision, and specialization in roles: Agents either invest in the
public good or form links, but not both. For other networks, however, links are strategic
complements, so that agents coordinate their links by connecting to central agents. This
leads to lower levels of public good provision, and less specialization; some agents will both
link and invest, leading to lower welfare.
Finally I present a model of time allocation between formal and informal labor supply
ii
where workers learn of informal job opportunities from their peers in a social network. In
addition to formal income taxation and enforcement, individuals labor supply decisions de-
pend on the number of their peers with informal jobs and the strength of social ties. Workers
allocate more time to informal activities when tax enforcement is lax and job information
transmission is good. More connected social networks (e.g. wheel, complete) feature lower
average income but higher average utility than poorly connected social networks (e.g. star,
empty). Average income may be non-monotonic in tax enforcement.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Social connections pervade out lives; people find jobs from their friends and family, learn
about political candidates from their peers, buy sell from people they know. The structure of
these networks have long been understand to have an a large effect in each of these situations;
workers with different social networks may have very different labor market outcomes; who
your peers are may have a large effect on you political opinions, and markets may be very
far from competitive, if buyers and sellers are not connected to one another. Because of
the importance social networks may have, the structure of social networks has long been an
important area of study.
How are these networks formed? In this dissertation I explore the source of structures in
social networks, and the impact this structure may have in economic settings. In chapter
2, I develop a model of Bayesian strategic network formation, in which agent heterogeneity
is modeled as a Bayesian game. In this way I am able to characterize equilibrium networks
even with heterogeneity, and I find an intimate connection between the two extremes of the
set of equilibria, and two different models of public good provision.
In chapter 3, I further explore the impact these extreme structures have in a setting where
agents share a public good along their social ties. Different network structures provide
different incentives for public good provision, which the incentive to produce the public good
being strongest in networks with the least coordination in linking; that is, efficient network
formation leads to inefficient public good provision. I characterize the set of equilibria, and
show that only for the least coordinated networks does specialization in roles arise, where
some agents form links, while others produce the public good, and no agent does both.
In chapter 4, I consider the impact network structures in the labor market have for time
allocation and labor market participation in the formal and informal sectors. Characterizing
the long run steady state properties of the model, we show that income may not be monotonic
in labor market law enforcement; less enforcement leads to more time allocation to informal
work, but and the same time allows more workers without informal jobs to expect to find
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them, and so allocate more time to leisure. So, even as utility in increasing, income may be
decreasing.
2
CHAPTER 2
HETEROGENEITY IN SOCIAL NETWORKS AND
THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF PUBLIC GOODS
2.1 Introduction
There are many situations and contexts in which the detailed patterns of local interaction
and the structure of interpersonal relationships will influence economic outcomes. Such
networks often serve as a conduit for information, and transmit job information, fashion
preferences, or even disease from one person to another (Granovetter [37], Jackson [43]). In
other settings, networks are viewed directly as an asset, as in models of social insurance; in
developing countries where people do not have access to formal insurance markets, their social
contacts provide a substitute (Fafchamps and Lund [26]). Networks are often an important
structural feature of an economic situation, such as markets where buyers and sellers must
interact directly (Kranton and Minehart [51]), or markets with network constraints, such as
electricity and airline networks (Hendricks, Piccione and Tan [39] and Cho [20]). This lead
us to ask, how do agents choose to form these links?
I consider a setting where agents are heterogeneous in the value they derive from their
connections to one another, and have incomplete information on this heterogeneity among
their peers. Agents form links non-cooperatively, and receive utility for every other agent
they are connected to in the resulting network, whether directly or indirectly. This value is
private information, independently and identically distributed across agents. For every link
they choose to form, they bear a cost. Given her personal value, agents must choose whether
and with whom to form connections. The kind of heterogeneity in this model is one where
each agent has an unknown, different value to every other agents; one agent does not know,
ex ante, whether or not the information she has is of value to other agents. Because she does
not know if others will form links and connect the network for her, she must weigh her own
personal value of the information of others against the likely actions of the other agents.
An example of a setting this model describes is job contacts; that is, the pattern of contacts
among acquaintances searching for jobs. Here one agent may contact another without her
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consent; the assumption that after doing so the contacted agents value(and the value of all
her contact agents) is available to the contacter amounts to assuming that the information
those agents may have that is of value to the contacter is costlessly collected and transmitted
to the contacter, without any incentive or “holdup” problems.
I characterize the set of equilibria for three agents, and identify the extremes of this set. On
one extreme, agents form a link to a single central agent, while on the other, they form links
to every other agent. Other equilibria are essentially combinations of these two extremes;
one set of agents, the “insiders” , form many links with one another, while agents in another
set, the “outsiders.”, form a single link to an insider. The structures that arise in equilibrium
are “core” and “periphery” networks; the insiders form a dense core to the network, with
many links to one another, while the outsiders for a periphery, with at most a single link
to an insider. Network structures form stochastically, contingent on the private values of
each agent; star and circle structures may still arise, but they are only two of many possible
outcomes.
These extreme equilibria have a natural interpretation in terms of public good provision:
When agents form links to a single insider, the equilibrium is equivalent to a cost sharing
provision rule of an excludable club good. On the other extreme, where every agent forms
links to everyone, the equilibrium is equivalent to the voluntary provision of a pure public
good. Intermediate cases of this family of equilibria are essentially combinations of these
two extremes. The strategic nature of each agent’s linking decision depends on her position
in the network; link formation reproduces both pure public good provision and club good
provision as special cases.
This highlights the tension between the private benefits and public externalities of social
connections. Insiders wish to avoid being left unconnected when their peers free-ride. In
equilibrium, this leads them to form superfluous links to one another, creating a densely
connected “core” to the network. In contrast, outsiders coordinate their links and access
many peers with a single link to the core; they do not free ride. Both of these incentives
lead to centralized network structures, in which the path connecting any two agents is short.
Clustering, the tendency of connected agents to have peers in common, arises endogenously
among the insiders. This equilibrium of the network formation game thus produces two
important features of observed social networks, and both of these structures are present in
the same equilibrium.
This paper is a contribution to the literature of network formation. LIT The main contribu-
tion is a model of strategic network formation with incomplete information. The connections
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model was first introduced by Jackson and Wolinksy [45], and studied in non-cooperative
form by Bala and Goyal [8]. They focused on symmetric agents and strong solution con-
cepts, which has the virtue of being analytically tractable. The large number of actions and
outcomes is a constant problem in network theory. It is unsatisfying, however, to be unable
to analyze agents that differ in their social abilities or have less than perfect information
about their peers. Moreover, the structures predicted by the symmetric model are implausi-
bly stark; circles and stars the typical outcomes. This is very different from the complicated
networks that appear in the data, and there is little to suggest how agents are sorted into
their network positions.1
Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst [66] also incorporate heterogeneity into the connections
model, retaining the solution concepts of Bala and Goyal [8]. They allow for heterogeneity in
the values and costs of linking, and obtain an “anything goes” result: Any minimal network
is an equilibrium for some profile of values and costs. The flexibility of their model thus
comes at the cost of strong predictions.
The role incomplete information may play in network formation has not been extensively
considered; McBride [55] studies an environment where agents have incomplete information
on the structure of the network: When agents are aware only of the local structure of social
ties, equilibrium networks will be very different that when agents have full information, and
will be inefficient. This paper, in contrast, considers only incomplete information on the types
of one’s peers, so that conditional on types and strategies, there is complete information on
the structure of the network. Completmentary
The second contribution is a characterization of this model for the case of three agents, and
the identification of a class of equilibria in this case that is extended to case of n agents. Core-
periphery structures, as arise in my model, have been found to be important in many settings,
from economic geography (Krugman [52]) and corporate structure (Mintz and Shwartz [56],
Mizruchi [57]), to friendship (Adamic and Adar [1]) and academic citations (Borgatti [14]).
Other works study the different forces that lead to such centralized structures. Hojman
and Szeidl [40] consider an environment close to that of Bala and Goyal [8], with stronger
conditions on the decay of value across links, and diminishing returns to connections. In
their complete information environment, stars are the unique equilibrium. My model shows
that such outcomes can arise from self-organization among ex ante identical agents.
The third contribution is a characterization of this class of equilibria in terms of public
good provision. The externalities present in link formation have been recognized by network
1For a survey on data and methods in the economics of networks, see Jackson [44].
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theorists; Bramoulle´ and Kranton consider a model of public good provision on networks,
and the importance of the structure of the network for incentives in public good provision
is key. This paper shows that not only are the links a kind of public good, but the kind of
public good it is may depend on the entirety of the network, on the structure of the network
itself. Goyal and Galeotti [31] endogenize link formation in a similar model, and find that
many different structures may be equilibria, with many possible configurations of investment
and link formation. By contrast, this paper considers only link formation, and the network
itself is the public good being provided.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Non-cooperative Network Formation
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents, with n ≥ 3. Each agent i ∈ N values being
connected to the other agents. To receive this value, she may initiate links to them. An
action of an agent i is an element ai ∈ Ai = {0, 1}n, where aij = 1 indicates that agent i
initiates a link to agent j, and I adopt the convention that aii ≡ 0.2 Agents choose how
many links to initiate simultaneously. Two agents i and j are connected in a graph g, written
gij = 1, if either i or j initiates a link to the other. Therefore, gij = max (aji, aij). I let g(a)
represent the graph that forms given the profile of actions a. Value flows both ways across
a link in the network; an agent need not initiate any links to receive positive utility, if the
links of others connect her to the network. In the terminology of Bala and Goyal [8], this is
a model of two-way flow of value.
For example, with 3 agents, if a12 = 1, a23 = 1, a32 = 1, and a31 = 1, the graph that forms
is g = {12, 13, 23}, the complete graph (Figure 2.1). Because the flow of value is two-way, I
need not specify a direction for the links in the graph. Given a graph g, we can calculate the
number of agents to whom agent i has a path in g. There is a path from i to j in network g
if there is a sequence of distinct agents {j1, . . . , jm} such that gij1 = gj1j2 = · · · = gjmj = 1.
Let Ni(g) be the number of agents to whom i has a path in g, and let µ(ai) =
∑
j aij be the
number of links that i initiates.
Agents are heterogeneous in the benefits they receive from each agent to whom they have
a path in the graph g. Each agent i has a type θi that represents these benefits; she receives
2This reflects the convention that agent i receives no benefit from a connection to herself.
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Figure 2.1: A profile of actions and the resulting graph.
θi for each agent to whom she has a path in g.
3 That is, agents differ in how they value
others, but each agent values all others equally.4 An agent bears a cost c > 0 for each link
she initiates. This cost is the same for all agents.5 Agent’s types are independently and
identically distributed according to a distribution F , which has support [0, 1]. Each agent’s
type θi is private information, known only to herself.
The timing of the game is as follows: (i) each agent observes her type θi; (ii) each agent
simultaneously chooses which links to initiate, in ignorance of the types of the other agents;
(iii) the profile of initiated links defines a graph g from which agents receive benefits, and
experience the cost of the links they initiated. The utility she receives from a profile of
actions a is therefore
U(θi, ai, a−i) = Ni(g(ai, a−i)) θi − µ(ai) c.
A strategy is a mapping si : [0, 1] → Ai that specifies an action in Ai for each type θi of
agent i. Given that an agent forms links knowing her own type, but in ignorance of anyone
else’s, the natural solution concept is Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Given her own type and
beliefs about the types and strategies of others, each agent chooses her links to maximize her
expected utility. A profile of strategies s∗ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for all a′ ∈ Ai,
θi ∈ [0, 1], and for all i,
Eθ−i [U(s
∗
i (θi), s
∗
−i(θ−i), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [U(a′, s∗−i(θ−i), θi)|θi].
3Unlike other treatments of the connections model, I omit any notion of decay, where the value an agent
derives from a path to another agent falls with the length of that path. The inclusion of small amounts of
decay would have little effect on equilibrium structures, because in equilibrium paths are short. Large decay
would significantly affect the results, and are beyond the scope of this paper.
4This contrasts with the case in which each agent had a distinct value for each agent she could connect
to, or other, more general kinds of heterogeneity.
5Because expected utility is linear in values and costs, this model is equivalent to one where the value
agents receive is a parameter, and agents are heterogeneous in the costs of linking.
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Agents only care about (1) how many other agents to whom they have a path in the graph,
Ni(g(a)), and (2) how many links they initiate, µi(ai). Because of this, the sum of all agent’s
utilities may be the same for many different graphs. This simplifies efficiency considerations.
A network is efficient if it maximizes the sum of all agents utilities given the realized profile
of types θ. Because each agent provides utility to other agents in the network, it is possible
that an agent’s utility is negative in an efficient network. This occurs when the value other
agents receive from her presence is high enough that she should be connected to the network,
but her own value from the network is less than the cost of any links she forms. Since it does
not matter for efficiency who pays for the links to connect the network, a network where
some agents have negative utility may still be efficient.
If it is efficient for the entire set of agents N to form a nonempty graph, the graph must
be minimal. It must have exactly n− 1 links, so that deleting any link would disconnect the
graph into disjoint components. This is because there is no value to having multiple paths
to other agents, and redundant links are costly. Furthermore, if any nonempty graph has
positive value, an efficient graph must be connected : Every agent must have a path to every
other agent. This characterizes efficient graphs.
Proposition 1 Any minimal connected graph is efficient if and only if
∑
i θi ≥ c. The
empty graph is efficient if and only if
∑
i θi ≤ c.
Several important architectures are both minimal and connected, and therefore efficient.
A center-sponsored star sponsored by agent j, is a graph in which ajk = 1 ∀k 6= j, and
akl = 0∀k 6= j, ∀l. Agent j initiates links to all other agents, and no other links are initiated.
Agent j is called the center of the star. A periphery-sponsored star centered on agent j, is a
graph in which akj = 1 ∀k, k 6= j, and akl = 0 ∀k, ∀l 6= j, and ajl = 0 ∀l. In this graph, all
other agents form a single link to agent j, who is again the center of the star, and no other
links are formed. Both action profiles give rise to the same graph g, a star. Both of these
networks are minimal and connected. In fact, in any star the maximum length of a path
from one agent to another is two.6
Two related architectures will be important. (1) A redundant center-sponsored star differs
from the center-sponsored star in that there is more than one agent in the center who initiates
links to every other agent. These networks are not minimal: Each agent in the center initiates
links to everyone, so there are more links than are required to connect the network. (2) An
6Many other familiar architectures are also efficient. A line, in which every agent but one initiates a single
link, and every agent but one receives a single link, is minimal and connected. In fact, every connected tree,
a graph without loops that contains every agent, is efficient.
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Figure 2.2: Clockwise from the upper left, a center-sponsored star, a periphery-sponsored
star, an incomplete periphery-sponsored star, and a redundant center-sponsored star.
incomplete periphery-sponsored star differs from the periphery-sponsored star in that not
every agent forms a link to the center agent: Some agents are left unconnected, and the
periphery is incomplete. This network is not connected, and therefore is inefficient. These
architectures are depicted in figure 2.2.
2.2.2 Public Good Provision
To make explicit the connection between network formation and public good provision, I
analyze two well known models of non-cooperative public good provision. The same set
of agents N may choose to provide a public good Y ∈ {0, 1}. This public good is binary
and indivisible, and costs K to provide. I consider both pure public good goods, where the
benefits of the good are nonrival and nonexcludable, and excludable public goods without
congestion, where the benefits of the good are nonrival but excludable. Such a public good
is commonly called a club good. Agent i receives value θi from the good, and this value is
private information. It is drawn from [0, 1], according to F , just as in the link formation
model. This value will enter utility in a different way in each of the two models of public
good provision I consider.
Voluntary Contribution to a Pure Public Good without Refunds. In the contri-
bution game, the public good is nonrival and nonexcludable. Each agent may choose to
make some payment bi ∈ R+ to fund the good. The good is provided only if the sum of
contributions exceed the cost of provision, K. If the sum is less than K, contributions are
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not returned. If the sum exceeds K, excess contributions are not returned.7 Agent i’s utility
is
Ui(bi, b−i, θi) =
{
θi − bi,
∑
bj ≥ K;
−bi,
∑
bj < K.
If the public good is provided, everyone benefits. A strategy is a function t : [0, 1] → R+
that specifies a contribution in R+ for every type θi of agent i . A profile of strategies t
∗ is
a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium if for all b′ ∈ R+, θi ∈ [0, 1], and all i,
Eθ−i [U(t
∗
i (θi), t
∗
−i(θ−i), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i[U(b′, t∗−i(θ−i), θi)|θi].
The Voluntary Cost Sharing Mechanism of an Excludable Public Good. The
second model of project provision that I consider is the voluntary cost sharing mechanism.
The public good is now assumed to be nonrival but excludable. An agent who does not pay
to fund the mechanism is excluded from its benefits. It is still binary and indivisible. Actions
are now di ∈ {0, 1}. An agent who chooses di = 1 indicates that she is willing to share the
cost K of providing the public good; this cost is divided equally among all agents who signal
1. An agent who signals 0 pays nothing, and is excluded. This is a model of a club good,
where agents must pay to join the club, and the membership benefits are nonrival. Agent
i’s utility is
Ui(di, d−i, θi) =
{
θi − K∑
j dj
, di = 1;
0, di = 0.
A strategy is a function r : [0, 1] → {0, 1} that specifies an action in {0, 1} for every type
of agent i. A profile of strategies r∗ is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium if for all d′ ∈ {0, 1},
θi ∈ [0, 1], and all i,
Eθ−i [U(r
∗
i (θi), r
∗
−i(θ−i), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i[U(d′, r∗−i(θ−i), θi)|θi].
Efficiency in the provision of public goods is characterized simply: If the sum of all agents’
values for the good exceeds the cost of provision, then it is efficient to provide the good.
This holds for both the contribution game and the voluntary cost sharing mechanism. In
the contribution game, efficiency in cost allocation requires that no agent over-contribute to
the good when it is provided: Excess contributions above the minimum required to fund the
good are wasted. If it is efficient not to provide the good, agents must make no contributions
7The lack of refunds is not essential to the result. The same equilibrium exists in the model with and
without refunds, but notation is needlessly complicated with refunds.
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at all: Positive contributions are wasted. The voluntary cost sharing mechanism does not
have this problem: By construction, agents cannot over-contribute to funding the good, and
if the good is provided, some agent has agreed to bear the cost, so agents cannot under-
contribute either. Efficiency only requires that if the sum of all agents’ values exceeds the
cost of provision, then at least one agent must signal a willingness to pay, and every agent
must be included in its benefits. Because there is no congestion or rivalry in the utilization
of the public good, it is never efficient to exclude anyone in the voluntary cost sharing
mechanism. It may be that an agent would prefer not to participate in the voluntary cost
sharing mechanism, because her benefit θ may be less than her share of the cost of provision.
Efficiency still requires that she be included, however, because the total cost of provision
does not depend on the number of agents included, and including her increases total welfare.
I summarize with the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If
∑
θi ≥ K, it is efficient to undertake the public good, and if
∑
θi < K it
is efficient not to. If the good is provided, efficiency in the contribution game requires that∑
bi = K, and efficiency in the cost sharing mechanism requires that all agents be included
in the project.
2.3 The Three Agent Case
It is clear that the link formation model may have many different equilibria. To illustrate
the possibilities, I exhaustively characterize all equilibria of link formation model for the case
of three agents, when types are drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. This simple
case still has many equilibria, including symmetric and asymmetric equilibria, involving pure
and mixed strategies.8 These equilibria vary both in the willingness of agents to form links,
as a function of their private value for connections, and the architecture these links will be
arranged in, if initiated.
Proposition 3 There are exactly 5 classes of equilibrium strategies for the three agent case
with uniform values, which the following architectures:
1. A circle, with two possible orientations.
8This is not a symmetric game in the strictest sense, because each agent has a different set of feasible
actions; agent i can link to agent k, but agent k cannot link to herself. The meaning of symmetric is just
that each agent face the same decision problem, and uses the same cutoff rule in equilibrium.
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium strategies in the three agent case. Solid lines indicate pure
strategies in link formation, dashing lines indicate mixed strategies.
2. A periphery-sponsored star, with agent 1, 2 or 3 in the center.
3. A center-sponsored star, with one, two or three agents in the center.
4. A hybrid structure, where two agents link each other and the third links mixes between
forming a link to either of them. There are two such equilibria, one where the agents
linking each other also form a link to the third agent if their value is high enough, and
one where they do not.
5. A full mixing structure, where each agent mixes in forming a single link to one of the
other agents.
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Figure 2.3 depicts these strategies.9 In the circle equilibrium, each agent forms a single
link to another, forming a circle. This is only an equilibrium when the number of agents is
low; when there are more agents, the probability of having a path to an agent on the far
side of the circle is low, and agents would prefer to deviate and ‘link across’ the circle. With
three agents, there is no need, because each agent is only one link away from every other
agent.
In the center-sponsored star, agents choose either to link to every other agent, or not link
at all. This is an equilibrium for one, two or three agents in the center, choosing to form
links. If only two agents choose to form links, for example, the third agent is passive, and
the others form links with higher probability. In the periphery-sponsored star, two agents
choose whether or not to link to the third agent, who forms no links. This is an equilibrium
for each agent i, j, or k in the center.
In the hybrid equilibrium, two agents form a single link to one another, while the third
agent mixes in forming a single link to either of them. There are two such equilibria, one
where the non-mixing agents also forms a link to the mixing agent if their value is sufficiently
high, and one where they do not. In the full mixing structure, each agent mixes in forming
a single link to one of the other two agents.
While this is a large number of seemingly diverse equilibria, there is a pattern among
them. We can view the three agent center-sponsored star, the periphery-sponsored stars,
and the hybrid equilibria without second links as members of a family of equilibria. To see
this, split the set of agents into one nonempty group I ⊆ N of insiders, and O = N/I of
outsiders. The following is an equilibrium strategy profile. For agents i ∈ I, let
sI(θ) =
{
aik = 0 ∀k, θ < θI ;
aik = 1 for k ∈ I, aik = 0 else, θ > θI .
That is, agents in I will link to every other agent in I if their value is above a cutoff θI , and
will otherwise form no links. For agents i ∈ O, let
sO(θ) =
{
aik = 0 ∀k, θ < θO;
aik = 1 with probability
1
|I| ∀k ∈ I, aik = 0 ∀ k /∈ I θ > θO.
This strategy calls for agents in O to link to a single agent in I if their value exceeds θO,
with equal probability for each. If their value is below θO, they form no links. This profile
of strategies is an equilibrium for any partition of the set for agents with at least one agent
9That is, these figures describe strategies, not realized networks.
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in I.
The equilibrium architecture of this strategy profile is a set of insiders, who are connected
to each other in a redundant center-sponsored star, and a set of outsiders, each of whom
forms a single link to one of the insiders. This is the insiders-outsiders family of equilibria.
The three-agent center-sponsored star is the special case of the insider-outsider equilibrium
where I = N , and every agent is an insider. The periphery-sponsored star is the case where
I = {k}, for a particular agent k. Here, everyone but k is an outsider. The hybrid is the
case where I = {j, k}, two insiders and one outsider. The center-sponsored stars with fewer
than 3 agents are not special cases of the insider-outsider equilibrium, nor is the hybrid
equilibrium with second links or the mixing equilibria.
The three agent center-sponsored star and the periphery-sponsored star form two extremes
of the set of equilibria, in the following sense: They represent the most and the least free-
riding by agents who form links. All other equilibria are intermediate cases. The extent to
which an agent may free-ride is determined by whether or not other agents will connect her
to the rest of the network, without any action on her part. In the circle equilibrium, there is
one agent who may do so. For agents forming links in the one or two-agent center-sponsored
equilibrium, there are zero of one agent who may do so, respectively.
In the three-agent center-sponsorship equilibrium, each of an agent’s peers may connect
her to the network, so the potential for free-riding is greatest. In the periphery-sponsorship
equilibrium, neither of an agent’s peers will connect her to the network, so there is no
potential for free-riding.
2.4 Insiders and Outsiders for n > 3
I focus only on the insiders-outsiders family of equilibria for larger populations, for several
reasons. First, the predicted architecture has a core-periphery structure, and this architec-
ture in many studies of social networks, from the structure of corporate directorates (Mintz
and Shwartz [56], Mizruchi [57])and friendship (Adamic and Adar [1]) to labor market con-
tacts(Cross et al. [62]). Indeed, the structure of the equilibrium networks is exactly the
idealized core-periphery graph as defined by Borgatti and Everett [14], who find empirical
support for this classification in the structure of citation networks (Baker [7]).
Secondly, while stars are a common equilibrium architecture of many network formation
games, they are rarely played in laboratory settings (Falk and Kosfeld [27], Kosfeld [50]).
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Goeree et. al. [34] find that changes in the informational structure of the game and private
information lead to more star and ”star-like” structures in experiments, in a model similar
to that studied here.
Finally, this family contains the two extremes of the set of equilibria, the center-sponsorship
equilibrium and the periphery sponsorship equilibrium. It is in these two equilibria that the
public good nature of network formation is most evident, and these two equilibria illustrate
the competing incentives present in the link formation game.
The insiders-outsiders profile of strategies is an equilibrium for general distributions of
value F , and arbitrary numbers of agents. I now characterize the general case. Let I ⊆ N
be the set of insiders, which can have size |I| = 1, . . . , n. Define θI and θO implicitly by
F (θI)
|I|−1(
n− |I|
|I| (1− F (θO))θI) + (1− F (θI)
|I|−1)((|I| − 1)θI + (n− |I|)(1− F (θO))θI) =
(|I| − 1)(θI − c) + (n− |I|)(1− F (θO))θI ,
(2.1)
F (θI)
|I|(θO+
n− |I| − 1
|I| (1−F (θO))θO)+(1−F (θI)
|I|)(|I|θO+(n−|I|−1)(1−F (θO))θO)−c = 0.
(2.2)
θI and θO are the critical type of insiders and outsiders, respectively, that are indifferent
between forming and not forming a link. That is, these conditions equate the equilibrium
benefit of a link to the cost of that link. There is one condition for insiders, and one for
outsiders. These critical types determine the cutoffs agents use in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (Insider-Outsider Equilibrium) For i ∈ I the strategy sI(θ) given by
sI(θ) =
{
0n−1, θ < θI ;
aik = 1 for k ∈ I, aik = 0 else, θ > θI .
and for i /∈ I, the strategy sO(θ) given by
sO(θ) =
{
0n−1, θ < θO;
aik = 1 ∀k ∈ I, aik = 0 ∀ k /∈ I, with probability 1|I| . θ > θO,
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(a) Zero Centers (b) One Center
(c) Two Centers (d) Three Centers
Figure 2.4: Four possible realized networks for Uniform values, c = .5, with 15 insiders and
15 outsiders.
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the network formation game, if
c > F (θO) + (1− F (θ0)F (θI)|I|−1(2 + n− |I| − 1|I| (1− F (θO))).
This is an equilibrium for any n. The range of c is restricted to ensure that an equilibrium
exists. Links cannot be so inexpensive that insiders wish to deviate and form direct links to
outsiders, and outsiders must not wish to form direct links to other outsiders, or multiple
links to insiders. In addition, the cost of links cannot be so high that no one wishes to link
to anyone. These restrictions are satisfied by many different distributions F .
Example 1 (Uniform Values) When value are distributed uniformly on [0, 1], F (θ) = θ,
16
1
c
1
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Figure 2.5: The insiders-outsiders equilibrium for Uniform values, , for n = 5, I = 2. θI is
given by the dashing line, θO by the solid line. The bolded portions represent the range of c
over which this is an equilibrium.
the cutoffs θI and θO solve
θ
|I|−1
I (
n− |I|
|I| (1− θO)θI) + (1− θ
|I|−1
I )((|I| − 1)θI + (n− |I|)(1− θO)θI) =
(|I| − 1)(θI − c) + (n− |I|)(1− θO))θI
and
θ
|I|
I (θO +
n− |I| − 1
|I| (1− θO)θO) + (1− θ
|I|
I )(|I|θO + (n− |I| − 1)(1− θO)θO)− c = 0.
Figure 2.5 depicts θI and θO as a function of c for n = 5 and I = 2. Four possible realized
networks are depicted in 2.4.
There are multiple solutions to equations (2.1) and (2.2) because outsiders’ actions are
complements: The more likely outsiders are to link, the higher is the expected utility from
such a link. For uniform values, there are two different equilibrium cutoffs for outsiders,
corresponding to a high and low link likelihoods. These two cutoffs are both equilibria for
c > 1; for c < 1 the high cutoff is not an equilibrium, because links are too cheap, and
agents would deviate and form more. Multiple cutoffs for outsiders leads to multiple cutoffs
for insiders: When outsiders are highly likely to link, insiders have a higher incentive to
free ride, and so a different cutoff than when outsiders are less likely to link. This model
thus delivers a natural feature of social networks. The more friends someone has, the more
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valuable she is as a friend, and the more people wish to be her friend. In contrast, an agent
with few friends is less attractive as a friend; this phenomenon arises as possible equilibria
among ex ante identical agents, typical in coordination games.
The conclusions that Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst [66] draw from their insiders-outsiders
model arise endogenously here. They partition the set of agents into two groups, who have a
low cost when linking within their own group, and a higher cost when linking across groups.
This ex ante asymmetry between agents induces an asymmetry in the equilibrium structures
similar to the structures I find. First, they find that one group will form a core that is
internally connected, while the other group only links to the core, and not to each other.
Second, they find that this structure holds generally, regardless of the number of agents,
so that even a large network has a low diameter. Third, they find that centrality is im-
portant: All links are oriented towards some central player. Each of these properties arises
in this model, but I do not impose the restriction that agents are exogenously partitioned
into groups with different linking costs. In my model, the asymmetries arise endogenously
among ex ante symmetric agents. The partitioning of agents into groups is an equilibrium
phenomenon that is self-supporting.
Insiders and outsiders have different views of the strategic nature of their decision. To make
these differences explicit, I consider the two extremes of the insider-outsider equilibrium; (i)
the case where every agent is an insider and (ii) the case where every agent but one is an
outsider. In the first case, we have the following:
Corollary 1 (Center-Sponsored Equilibrium) Suppose that F (c) < 1. Then there ex-
ists θI defined implicitly by
θF (θ)n−1 = c. (2.3)
Let
sI(θi) =
{
{0}n−1, if θi ≤ θI ;
{1}n−1 θi > θI
Then for c ∈ [0, 1], {sI} is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the network formation game.
Here, every agent is an insider, I = N . Each agent chooses to either link to every other
agent, or to no one. There is only a single solution to the the insider cutoff condition, which
in this case reduces to equation (2.3). This is because links are not complements for insiders,
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Figure 2.6: Center-sponsored equilibrium with uniform values, in bold.
only for outsiders. For insiders, the more likely others are to link, the less the expected utility
from linking is; their actions are strategic substitutes. This leads to a unique equilibrium
cutoff.
Example 2 (Uniform Values) For the case of uniform values, F (θ) = θ, the cutoff θI
solves
θI(θI)
n−1 = c,
so that θI = c
1
n .
Figure 2.6 the equilibrium cutoff when values are distributed uniformly on [0, 1] is depicted
in. If an agent’s type θi is above the depicted curve, she is above the cutoff and forms a link
to every other agent. If her type is below the curve, she is below the cutoff, and forms no
links. Note that it is possible for an agent’s value to be above c, the cost of linking, but below
the equilibrium cutoff. That is, it may be that agents can profitably link to another, but
choose not to–they free-ride. It is possible that in equilibrium, every agent’s value is above
c but below θI , so that the network is empty. It is also possible that more than one agent’s
value is above θI , so that multiple agents form links to every other agent. Over-connection
and under-connection are both possible in equilibrium, and the network generally takes the
form of a redundant center-sponsored star. The more agents whose value exceeds θI , the
more centers in the star, and the more superfluous links.
On the other extreme, when I = {k}, everyone but agent k is an outsider.
19
Corollary 2 (Periphery-Sponsored Equilibrium) Define θn−1O and θ
n−1
m implicitly by
θ
(
1 + (n− 2)(1− F (θ)))= c, (2.4)
θ =
1 + (n− 2)(1− F (θ))
(n− 2)f(θ) .
For a selected agent k, consider the following strategy profile:
1. Agent k forms no links.
2. All other agents follow a cutoff strategy:
sO(θi) =
{
{0}n, if θi < θn−1O ;
(k), if θi > θ
n−1
O .
The action (k) denotes a single link to agent k. That is, link to agent k if θi > θ
n−1
O ,
and otherwise form no links.
For
(n−1)θn−1
O
(n−2)θn−1
O
+1
≤ c ≤ θn−1m
(
1 + (n− 2)(1− F (θn−1m ))
)
, this strategy profile is a Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium of the network formation game, for every k.
I index the cutoff θn−1O by n. This index will be important when I later compare this
equilibrium to models of public good provision. In this equilibrium, agent k is a passive
insider and forms no links, while every other agent chooses whether or not to link to her.10
The upper restriction on c ensures that the cutoff exists, while the lower restriction eliminates
deviations.
Example 3 (Uniform Values) For the case of uniform values, F (θ) = θ, the cutoff θO
solves
θ(1 + (n− 2)(1− θ)) = c. (2.5)
Equation (2.5) has two solutions. There is a high cutoff solution and a low cutoff solution.
Let θHO be the high cutoff, and θ
L
O be the low cutoff. They are given by
10This is similar to the equilibrium structure of Hojman and Szeidl [40], but is driven by strategic behavior
rather than decay in value.
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θLO =
(n− 1)−√(n− 1)2 − 4c(n− 2)
2(n− 2) (2.6)
θHO =
(n− 1) +
√
(n− 1)2 − 4c(n− 2)
2(n− 2) . (2.7)
Figure 2.7 depicts these cutoffs. The lower and upper arcs of the parabola correspond to
solutions to (2.6) and (2.7), respectively.
The ranges of c over which these solutions represent equilibria differ for the high and low
cutoffs. The low cutoff equilibrium requires that
c ≥ (n− 1)θ
L
O
(n− 2)θLO + 1
⇒ c ≥ 0.
The high cutoff equilibrium requires that
c ≥ (n− 1)θ
H
O
(n− 2)θHO + 1
⇒ c ≥ 1.
The low cutoff equilibrium exists even for small c because the expected utility from a single
link to the center agent is so high that there is no cost small enough to make additional
links worthwhile. The high cutoff equilibrium, in contrast, only exists for costs so high that
no agent can profitably connect to isolated agents on the periphery. This is represented by
the 45Ph.D. line in figure 2.7 that connects the upper and lower arcs of the curve; only the
portions of the curve to the left of the 45Ph.D. line represent an equilibrium.
The structure of the equilibrium network in this case is an incomplete periphery-sponsored
star. Each agent whose value is above the cutoff forms a link to the center, and each agent
whose value is below the cutoff does not. Unlike the center-sponsored equilibrium, the
periphery-sponsored equilibrium is never empty when every agent’s value is above c; when
that happens, every agent’s value is above the low equilibrium cutoff. This equilibrium
suffers from a different kind of under-connection, however: Some agents choose not to link
to the center and are thus unconnected to the network.
The periphery-sponsored equilibrium exists for wider ranges of costs c than the center-
sponsored equilibrium. This is because in the periphery-sponsored equilibrium, agents receive
all of their value via a single link. Even if the cost of that link is high, they may find it
worthwhile to link to an insider. In the center-sponsored equilibrium, each link carries only
a small part of the total value each agent receives, so that when the costs of linking are too
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Figure 2.7: Periphery-sponsored equilibrium with uniform values, in bold.
high, agents prefer to form no links at all.
These two examples illustrate the two extremes of the insider-outsider equilibrium, and
the different network structures that arise. Intermediate cases are essentially combinations
of these two structures; insiders organize themselves in a redundant center-sponsored star,
while outsiders organize themselves in an incomplete periphery-sponsored star, centered not
on a single agent, but on the entire group of insiders. Insiders thus form a densely connected
core to the network, while outsiders form a sparsely connected periphery.
2.5 Equilibrium in Public Good Provision
I now characterize equilibria in the contribution game and the voluntary cost sharing mech-
anism.
Proposition 5 (Contribution Game) Suppose that F (c) < 1. Then there exists θI that
solves
θF (θ)n−1 = K.
Let
t(θ) =
{
0, θ ≤ θI
K, θ > θI
Then for 0 < K < (n− 1) the strategy profile {t} is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium
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strategy of the contribution game.
The equilibrium of the contribution game is to contribute the full amount necessary for
undertaking the project, K, or else to contribute nothing and free ride. The incentive to
free ride is strongest in this model, because if even a single peer contributes, the good will
be provided.
Proposition 6 (Voluntary Cost Sharing Mechanism) Let θnO solve
θ
(
1 + (n− 1)(1− F (θ)))= c,
and let θnm solve
θ =
1 + (n− 1)(1− F (θ))
(n− 1)f(θ)
Let
r(θ) =
{
0, if θ < θnO;
1, if θ > θnO.
That is, agree to bear part of the cost if θi > θ
n
O, and otherwise opt out. Then the strategy
profile {r} is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the voluntary cost sharing game for
0 ≤ c ≤ θnm
(
1 + (n− 2)(1− F (θnm))
)
.
I index the equilibrium by n, for comparison with the periphery-sponsored equilibrium of
the link formation model. Here, agents must choose whether or not to indicate willingness
to bear the cost of providing the good. If they do not agree to share the cost of providing the
good, then they are excluded from its benefits. An agent must therefore forecast how many
other agents will contribute to the good, and decide if her personal benefit from the good is
likely to be high enough for her to bear his expected share of the cost. In this equilibrium,
agents do not free-ride, and know that the more of their peers agree to share the cost, the
better.
2.6 Public Good Equivalence
I now derive the explicit relationship between the link formation game and public good
provision. Say that two models A and B satisfy equilibrium expected utility equivalence if
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there exists a pair of order-preserving functions h : XA → XB and g : Ai− > Bi such that
(i) if SA(θ,XA) is a profile of equilibrium strategies for model A, then SB = g(SA(θ, h(XA)))
is an a profile of equilibrium strategies for model B, and (ii)
Eθ−i [U(f(XA), g(SA(θ, h(XA))), θi)|θi] = Eθ−i[U(XA, SA(θ), XA), θI |θi].
That is, if we relabel parameters X and actions A, an equilibrium in one model is an
equilibrium in the other model, and an agent’s expected utility is the same in these equilibria,
given the relabeling. I now prove that the two extremes of the insider-outsider family of
equilibria, the center-sponsored equilibrium and the periphery-sponsored equilibrium, are
equilibrium expected utility equivalent to the contribution game and the voluntary cost
sharing mechanism, respectively.
In the center-sponsorship equilibrium of the link formation game, agents choose whether
or not to link to every other agent. This decision is effectively whether or not to provide
every agent with a path to every other agent, so that they will all receive the benefits of
the network. This is essentially the choice agents must make in the contribution game, of
whether or not to unilaterally provide the public good.
Proposition 7 The center-sponsorship equilibrium of the network formation game and the
contribution game satisfy equilibrium expected utility equivalence, with
h((θ, c, n)) = (
θ
n− 1 ,
K
n− 1 , n)
g(a) = µ(a)c.
Proposition 7 shows that the value and cost of a link in the link formation game is equiv-
alent to 1
n−1 of the value and cost of the public good in the contribution game, and that
choosing to form links in the link formation game is equivalent to choosing to provide the
good in the contribution game. In the link formation game, when there is a chance of being
connected to the network without having to form any links, there is an incentive to free
ride. This incentive is the strongest in the center-sponsored extreme of the insider-outsider
equilibria, because every other agent may have a high enough value to choose to connect
the entire network. Proposition 7 reveals that this incentive is so strong that the model is
equivalent to a model of provision of a pure public good.
The periphery-sponsored equilibrium, in contrast, is equilibrium expected utility equiv-
alent to the voluntary cost sharing mechanism of an excludable public good. Each agent
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chooses for herself whether to participate in the network by linking to the center agent. If she
does not link, no one else will connect her to the network; she is excluded. This is essentially
the choice an agent faces in the voluntary cost sharing mechanism.
Proposition 8 The periphery-sponsorship equilibrium of the network formation game and
the equilibrium of the voluntary cost sharing mechanism satisfy equilibrium expected utility
equivalence, with
h((θ, c, n)) = (
θ
(n− 1)(1− F (θnO))
,
K
(n− 1)(1− F (θnO))
, n+ 1)
g(a) = (aik).
Here, the value and cost of a link is (n−1)(1−F (θnO)) times the value and cost of the public
good in the voluntary cost sharing mechanism. An agent’s decision to link to the center in
the link formation game is the same as her decision to signal that she is willing to pay in the
voluntary cost sharing mechanism. There is no chance of being connected to the network by
another agent’s links, so agents have no incentive to free ride. They forecast their expected
utility from forming a link against the cost, and initiate the link if that expected utility
is sufficiently high. In the periphery-sponsored extreme of the insider-outsider equilibrium,
every agent beside the central agent behaves this way. Unlike the case of the center-sponsored
equilibrium and the contribution game, the periphery-sponsored equilibrium with n agents
is equivalent to the voluntary cost sharing mechanism with n − 1 agents. This is because
in the periphery-sponsored equilibrium, there is a center agent who is passive, so outsiders
only forecast the behavior of n − 1 other agents. The equivalence of this equilibrium is
with the n − 1 voluntary cost sharing mechanism: There is “one less” agent than in the
link formation game. Another difference between the periphery-sponsored equilibrium of
the link formation game is that there is no lower bound on c, besides 0. This is because
agents have no deviations that need to be disallowed: They cannot unilaterally provide the
goods themselves – they can only work through the given provision mechanism.
In this way I decompose the link formation equilibria into models of public good provision.
Insiders seek to free-ride on each other’s links, and in the extreme their decision problem is
equivalent to the provision of a pure public good. Outsiders coordinate their links by linking
to insiders, and in the extreme their decisions are equivalent to the provision of a club good.
Other equilibria are essentially combinations of these two extremes. In the intermediate
cases, insiders choose whether or not to provide a pure public good, where the outsiders
represent some “free” expected utility above the value of the good. Outsiders play a cost
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sharing game, but with a portion of their benefit coming not from cost reduction when
their peers contribute, but rather from a “free” group of insiders. The incentives in these
equilibria can be characterized by the extent to which one incentive or the other dominates;
whether agents are likely to be connected to the network by their peers, so that the free-
riding incentive of the pure public good dominates, or whether they can access many peers
with a single well-chosen link, so that the incentive of the club good dominate.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper I show that the connections model of link formation contains two very different
strategic incentives, and that both incentives may be present in equilibrium. I prove that
we can interpret link formation as a more general kind of public good, where the nature of
the public good and its method of provision are determined endogenously.
On the one hand, there is the classic free-riding incentive, in which to avoid being left
unconnected agents form many links of their own. This results in a densely connected
structure among insiders. On the other, there is the classic coordination problem, in which
agents must forecast the behavior of their peers in choosing whether or not to link. This
leads to a sparely connected periphery structure among outsiders.
Both of these incentives lead to centralized network structures, but for very different
reasons. Whereas insiders become the center of their own stars, outsiders coordinate their
links on an insider. The result is that in equilibrium all agents have short paths to one
another. Clustering arises as a byproduct of the excessive linking by insiders; since multiple
insiders may choose to become a center of a redundant center-sponsored star, any two insiders
who choose to link will share many peers in common.
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CHAPTER 3
LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS AND NETWORK
FORMATION
3.1 Introduction
There are many situations in which people rely on their peers for information; consumers may
observe the choices of their friends and families before making decisions (Feick and Prices
[28] ) and voters rely on their peers for information on candidates (Katz and Lazersfeld
[48] and Beck et. al. [10]). Patterns of research and development depend on the structure
of professional relationships (Valente [70]), and managers obtain information from their
personal contacts with one another (Cross and Parker [62]).
In each case, one agent has undertaken some costly activity, which benefits his peers.
These peers may have to bear some costs in maintaining a relationship with one another,
but given this relationship, the have access to each other’s information. Information is a
local public goods, whose benefits are not excludable among peers, but are nonetheless costly
to undertake. Individuals must decide what relationships to maintain, and how much value
to create themselves.
One such situation is the problem of strategic experimentation.1 If there is some underlying
state of the world agents wish to learn, they may undertake costly experiments, or observe
the result of their peer’s experiments. Experiments will have declining marginal value, as
later results are not as informative as early results. Thus, agents must choose how much
experimentation to do themselves, and which peers to attempt to learn from.
This paper presents a model of such local public goods and social network formation when
agents are heterogeneous. Individuals may either produce a public good themselves, or form
a costly link to their peers to access their production, or both. In order to learn from
another agent, they must be connected, whether directly or indirectly, in a social network.
My results show first that higher degrees of coordination in linking behavior, which results
1See Bikhchandani et. al. [11] for a a review of the social learning literature.
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in the formation of centralized structures such as stars, leads to lower levels of public good
provision. Second, it is only in networks with no coordination of links that agents will
specialize their roles, performing either link formation or public good provision, but not
both. Networks with coordination in linking always feature investment while linking, so that
some agents perform both roles.
Taken together, this shows that welfare is lowest in networks with more coordination, and
highest in networks with the least coordination. One might think that centralized network
structures lead to better outcomes, by allowing agents to connected to one another more
easily. Indeed the importance of well-connected central agents has been emphasized in many
studies of communication networks. It is this very ease of communication that reduces
the incentives to invest n the public good. In equilibrium the ability to economize on link
formation by coordinating links leads to lower welfare.
Social network formation with heterogeneity is an important problem that can be difficult
to handle, due to the large numbers of actions and outcomes. Previous work as avoided
this by focusing on symmetric agents and strong solution concepts, but it is important to be
able to accommodate environments where agents may differ in their social abilities, or lack
complete information about their peers. I introduce heterogeneity by treating it as private
information, and can draw strong conclusions even in a complex environment. I characterize
the equilibrium networks that arise, and the equilibrium levels of public good provision.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on network formation and public good
provision in networks. The network formation model closest in spirit is that of Bala and
Goyal [8]. Networks are formed non-cooperatively, so at least one agent in each relationship
undertakes some costly effort to maintain that relationship. This cost represents the time and
effort of social activities, and it is in this cost that agents are heterogeneous. This is due to
natural variation in the social skills of different people, which are private information. Given
their own private cost of forming social ties, individuals forecast the linking and investment
decisions of their peers, and make their own linking and investing decision.
In equilibrium, there are only a few possible network structures. These differ in the extent
to which agents are able to coordinate their links, and access more peers via a well-chosen
link to an intermediary. The ability to do so depends on the global architecture of the
network. On one extreme, there is no useful intermediary, and agents must either link to
everyone, or no one. This network features the most free-riding on link formation, because if
one’s peers link at all, they will connect the entire network. Other equilibria feature varying
degrees of coordination. Agents are willing to form a link to an intermediary, if their peers
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do so as well. The extreme case of coordination is a circle equilibrium, where agent’s single
links are arrange along a circle, and each agent’s peers are linking in exactly the way to
maximize the value of a single link. The interaction between the investment decision and
the linking decision is different in these diverse equilibrium network architectures.
A key question is whether agents will specialize in their roles: Will some individuals
form connections, and make no investment, while others invest in the public good, and
form no links? Kranton and Bramoulle [17] study the incentive to provide public goods
when the network structure is exogenously given. They find that specialization is always an
equilibrium, and that incentives for efficient provision of the good are stronger when there are
fewer links; the ability to free-ride on your peers reduces efficiency. Goyal and Galleotti [31],
consider a model of non-cooperative link formation and public good provision when agents
have perfect information on the actions of their peers, and there is no heterogeneity. They
find that specialization in linking and investment is possible, but there are many equilibrium
profiles without specialization.
In my model specialization hinges on the cost of public good provision and the global
structure of the social network. For every equilibrium architecture, if the cost of public good
provision is low enough, then all agents will make positive investments. When the cost of
the public good is larger, however, specialization depends on the network architecture. For
the uncoordinated equilibrium, agents fully specialize. Agents will either link to all of their
peers and make no investment, or invest in the public good and form no links. It is in
this architecture that the interaction between linking and investment is weakest, and agents
perform one role or the other, but not both. For other equilibrium network architectures,
however, the answer is no. No matter what the cost of public good production is, some
agents will both link and invest in the public good.
Both public good provision and link formation can be thought of as a kind of public good;
in both cases individuals prefer that their peers undertake the costly action of investing in
the public good and connecting them to the network. Link formation, however, is more com-
plicated.2 For some network architectures, linking decisions are complements; the more likely
my peers are to link to an intermediary, the more I also wish to link to that intermediary.
While incentives to link to the intermediary increase, incentives to invest in the public good
fall. If no one invests while linking the intermediary, however, coordination has no value;
there is no point in being connected to someone who is not investing. For these architectures
to be equilibria, agents must invest and link at the same time. Thus, specialization in
2See Jackson [43] for a comprehensive review of the economic networking literature.
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roles is only possible for one specific network architecture, where linking decisions are never
complements: the center-sponsorship equilibrium.
In the following section I present the model. In section 3.3 I characterize the equilibrium
linking and investment decisions, which I discuss further in section 3.4. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
Let N = {i, j, k} be the set of agents; that is, we consider a network of only three agents,
the smallest non-trivial network. Each agent has the ability to produce a public good, and
access the public good production of others. In order to do so, they may invest in public
good provision themselves, or form costly links to their peers.
If they have access to y units of the public good, either from their own investment or from
the investment of others, via the social network, they value this at u(y). The marginal benefit
of the public good is diminishing in y. Agents must choose a level yi of the public good to
produce themselves. The production has a linear per-unit cost of k, which is common to all
players.
In addition to producing the public good themselves, agents may choose to initiate links
to one another, in order to access the public good production of others. For each link an
agent chooses to initiate, she bears a cost ci. A linking choice of player i is an element
ai ∈ Ai = {0, 1}n, where aij = 1 indicates that agent i initiates a link to agent j, and
we adopt the convention that aii ≡ 0.3 Agents will choose how many links to initiate
simultaneously. Two agents i and j are connected in a graph g, written gij = 1, if either
agent i or agent j initiate a link to the other. Therefore, gij = max (aji, aij), and call the
graph that forms given the profile of actions a as g(a), or g(ai, a−i). Value flows both ways
across a link in the network; an agent need not initiate any links to receive positive utility, if
the links of others connect her to the public good investment of others. In the terminology
of Bala and Goyal [8], this is a model of two-way flow of value.
For example, with 3 agents, if a12 = 1, a23 = 1, a32 = 1, and a31 = 1, the graph that forms
is g = {12, 13, 23}, the complete graph (Figure 2.1). Because the flow of value is two-way, I
need not specify a direction for the links in the graph. Given a graph g, we can calculate the
number of agents to whom agent i has a path in g. There is a path from i to j in network g
3This reflects the convention that agent i need not pay any linking cost to benefit from her own public
good investment.
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if there is a sequence of distinct agents {j1, . . . , jm} such that gij1 = gj1j2 = · · · = gjmj = 1.
Let Ni(g) be the number of agents to whom i has a path in g, and let µ(ai) =
∑
j aij be the
number of links that i initiates.
Let g(a) be the network formed by the profile of linking decisions a. Let Ni(g) be the set
of agents to whom agent i has a path in the network g, and let µi(a) be the number of links
agent i initiates at the profile of actions a . Then the total value that agent receives is
U(yi, y−i, ai, a−i) = u(
∑
j∈Ni(g(a))
yj + yi)− kyi − µi(a)ci.
That is, agents receive value from their own investment in the public good, yi, as well as
the value of the investment done by any agents they have a path to in the network that
forms as a result of the linking decisions. They bear a linear cost k for any investment they
undertake, and a per link cost of ci for the links they form. Agents are heterogeneous in this
cost of linking; each agent has her own private cost of linking ci, and she views the costs of
her peers as coming from a common distribution of costs F (c), with support [0,∞]. Note
that there is no decay in value across links in this model; it does not matter how many links
a path has; an agent receives the same value regardless.
The solution concept is Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Given her type ci, each agent chooses
how much to invest in production of the public good, and whether and with whom to form
links, taking as given the strategies of the other agents. A profile of strategies (y∗, a∗) is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for all (y, a), ci, and for all i,
Ec−iU(y
∗, a∗) ≥ Ec−iU(y, y∗−i, a, a∗−i).
3.3 Equilibrium
3.3.1 Networks
Equilibrium strategies in the linking decision take the form of cutoff rules. Contingent on her
private cost of linking, she will either link to both of her peers, neither of her peers, or one
of her peers. For low private costs, below cLow, she will link to both, for high private costs
above cHigh she will link neither, and for intermediate private costs, she may choose to link
to one of her peers. There are only a limited number of possible equilibrium arrangements
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of that single link.
Proposition 9 Equilibria in linking actions take the form of cutoffs rules in each agent’s
private cost of linking. In any equilibrium, agents will form three links if their private cost
of linking is sufficiently low, and no links if it is sufficiently high, and possibly a single link
for intermediate costs. The only equilibrium architectures are the following:
1. A center-sponsorship equilibrium where agents either form no links or two links.
2. A periphery-sponsorship equilibrium, where one central agent either forms no links or
two links, and the other two agents either form no links, a single link to the central
agent, or two links.
3. A hybrid equilibrium, where two agents either form no links, a single link to one an-
other, or two links, while a third agent either forms no links, a single link at random
to one of the other two, or two links.
4. A mixing equilibrium, where each agent either forms no links, a single link to one of
the other agents with equal probability, or two links.
5. A circle equilibrium, where each agent either forms no links, a single link to a given
peers, forming a circle, two links.
Example 4 (Logarithmic Utility and Exponential Costs) To illustrate the equilibrium
linking decision, consider the following example:
u(y) = log (y + 1)
F (c) = 1− e−c
This utility function has several attractive properties. First, the marginal utility of the public
good is bounded above by 1; this is necessary if we are to have any specialization in investment
and link formation. If the marginal utility of the public good went to infinity, all investment
levels would always be positive. For this reason, it would be especially interesting if, despite
this functional form, agent did not fully specialize. In addition, for this utility function agents
never invest if k > 1, so we need only consider k ∈ [0, 1] to characterize the equilibrium.
The equilibrium linking cutoffs for this example are depicted in figures 3.1 to 3.5.
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Figure 3.1: Linking Strategies in the Center-Sponsorship Equilibrium. Agents form no
links if their private cost is above this line, or two links if it is below this line.
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Figure 3.2: Linking Strategies in the Periphery-Sponsorship Equilibrium. Outsiders form
two links if their cost is below the lower solid line, one link if it is between the two, or zero
links if it is above the upper solid line. The Insider forms two links if her cost is below the
dashed line, or no links if it is above the dashed line.
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Figure 3.3: Linking Strategies in the Hybrid Equilibrium. The Outsider forms two links if
her cost is below the lower solid line, one link if it is between the two, or zero links if it is
above the upper solid line. The Insiders forms two links if her cost is below the lower
dashed line, one link if it is between the two, or zero links if it is above the upper dashed
line.
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Figure 3.4: Linking Strategies in the Mixed Equilibrium. Each agent forms two links if her
cost is below the lower solid line, one link if it is between the two, or zero links if it is above
the upper solid line.
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Figure 3.5: Linking Strategies in the Circle Equilibrium. Each agent forms two links if her
cost is below the lower solid line, one link if it is between the two, or zero links if it is above
the upper solid line.
It is important to note that the center-sponsorship equilibrium and the mixed equilibrium
are the only symmetric equilibrium. The rest involve asymmetric strategies, where agents
with different positions in the network are treated differently by their peers. It is this asym-
metry that allows for coordination among the agents; any equilibrium in which some agents
direct their links to a specific individual will be asymmetric. In essence, by coordinating
their links, agents are able to profitable connect to one another for higher private costs of
linking, and economize on link formation. We will see that is it precisely this coordination
that leads to underprovision of the public good.
For the center-sponsored equilibrium, agents never for only one link; they either form two
or zero. In the periphery-sponsorship equilibrium, one agent never forms a single link, while
the other two coordinate their single links towards her. It is this coordination that is possible
in asymmetric equilibria, and for this reason, agents are willing to form a single link at lower
costs, and two links at higher costs, than in the center-sponsorship equilibrium.
Proposition 10 The linking cutoff in the center-sponsorship equilibrium cI satisfies c
Low <
cI < c
High for all equilibria where agents form a single link.
In the hybrid equilibrium, two agents form their single link to one another, while the
third forms her single link to one them at random. There is still more coordination in this
equilibrium, as the two “inside” agents coordinate by linking each other, and the third agent
coordinates by linking one of them.
These three equilibria can be considered members of a single “family” of equilibria. They
each consist of one set of agents, the “insiders,” who form many links to one another,
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and another set of agents, the “outsiders,” who form a single link to one of the insiders.
The center-sponsorship equilibrium is the case where every agent is an insider, the hybrid
equilibrium is the case where two agents are insiders, and one agent is an outsider, and
the periphery sponsorship equilibrium is the case where one agent is an insider and two are
outsiders.
In the mixed equilibrium, each agent forms her single link at random, to one of the
others with equal probability. There is no explicit coordination of links in this equilibrium,
but because the other agents are likely to be linked to one another, a single link is worth
forming.
Finally, in the circle equilibrium, each agent forms her single link to the next agent along
a circle; agent i links to j, who links to k, who links back to i. This equilibrium features the
most coordination. Agent j and k’s links are arranged in just the correct fashion to given
agent i the most incentive to link to j.
3.3.2 Investment
Contingent on the equilibrium linking strategies being played, and her position in that
network, each agent chooses her investment to maximize her expected utility, given the
conjectured strategies of her peers. Due to the concavity of the utility function, she will
always invest less when forming more links, because she expects to have access to more of
her peer’s investment.
Proposition 11 Equilibrium investment strategies take the following form:
yi(ci) =


yHighi , ci > c
High;
yMidi , c
High > ci > c
Low;
yLowi , ci < c
Low;
Where yHighi > y
Mid
i ≥ yLowi ≥ 0.
This is both a function of her private cost of linking ci, and her name, i, since agents
with different roles in the network will have different incentives to invest. Because in some
equilibria agents only for zero or two links, these agents do not make a yMidi investment
It is clear that for k sufficiently small, all investment levels in every equilibrium will be
positive; this follows from the fact that marginal utility is is never 0. For larger k, however,
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it may be that some of these investment levels are zero. If yMidi = y
Low
i = 0 for some agent
i in some equilibrium, we say that agent is using a specialized strategy ; when she links she
does not invest, and when she invests she does not link. In fact, in every equilibrium, for
every agent, there is some critical k∗ above which agents do not invest when they form links
to both of their peers.
Proposition 12 There exists a critical k∗ for every strategy, in every equilibrium network,
such that for k > k∗, yLowi = 0, and for k < k
∗, yLowi > 0.
So for k sufficiently large, agents do not invest when linking both of their peers. This
implies that for the center-sponsorship equilibrium, for k sufficiently large, agents do use
specialized strategies. Individuals with a low private cost of linking specialize in network
formation and form links to each of their peers. Individuals with a high private cost of
linking specialize in public good provision and form no links.
Is the same true for the other equilibrium architectures? Is it ever the case that yMidi = 0
for sufficiently large k? The answer is no: For these equilibria, for any agent who forms one
link, yMidi > 0
Proposition 13 In any equilibrium in which agents may form a single link, the level of
investment undertaken when forming that link is positive, for any cost of the public good k.
That is, yMidi > 0 for all k.
Example 5 The equilibrium investment strategies, for each equilibrium and for each role in
that equilibrium, are depicted for logarithmic utility and exponential costs in figures 3.6 to
3.12
3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Specialization
The various network architectures differ in the extent to which agents are able to free-ride
on one another’s links, and the extent to which agents face a coordination problem when
linking. This is turn leads to differences in investment behavior in each network. The critical
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Figure 3.6: Investment Strategies in the Center-Sponsorship Equilibrium. The higher curve
is the investment when forming zero links and the lower curve is investment when forming
two links.
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Figure 3.7: Investment Strategies in the Periphery-Sponsorship Equilibrium. The higher
curve is the investment when forming zero links and the lower curve is investment when
forming two links.
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Figure 3.8: Investment Strategies in the Periphery-Sponsorship Equilibrium. The higher
curve is the investment when forming zero links, the middle curve is investment when
forming one link, and the lower curve is investment when forming two links.
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Figure 3.9: Investment Strategies in the Hybrid Equilibrium. The higher curve is the
investment when forming zero links, the middle curve is investment when forming one link,
and the lower curve is investment when forming two links.
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Figure 3.10: Investment Strategies in the Hybrid Equilibrium. The higher curve is the
investment when forming zero links, the middle curve is investment when forming one link,
and the lower curve is investment when forming two links.
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Figure 3.11: Investment Strategies in the Mixed Equilibrium. The higher curve is the
investment when forming zero links, the middle curve is investment when forming one link,
and the lower curve is investment when forming two links.
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Figure 3.12: Investment Strategies in the Circle Equilibrium. The higher curve is the
investment when forming zero links, the middle curve is investment when forming one link,
and the lower curve is investment when forming two links.
Network Architecture k∗
Center-Sponsorship 0.367
Periphery-Sponsorship 0.364
Mixing 0.357
Hybrid 0.351
Circle 0.202
Table 3.1: Critical Values of k
cost of investment k∗ is one manifestation of this difference. The value of k∗ for logarithmic
utility and exponential costs for each network in table 3.1.
What determines the thresholds is the externality being exerted by the network archi-
tecture: In the center-sponsorship equilibrium, where link formation most strongly exhibits
free-riding, agents are relatively unable to rely on their peers to invest for them; for this
reason they begin to invest in the public good, even when linking, at a relatively high cost
of the public good. The remaining equilibria exhibit less free-riding in link formation, and
more free-riding in public good provision. Because they are able to access one another via
a single link, they do so at lower private costs of linking. This is possible because of the
coordination in their equilibrium linking strategies. This comes at the cost of public good
provision; because they are linked to one another more easily, they have a lower incentive
to invest in the public good, and so the equilibrium investment strategies are interior at a
lower critical k∗. The extreme case in the circle equilibrium, with the most coordination in
linking, and a very low cost k below which agents invest even when forming two links.
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Network Architecture k = .2
Center-Sponsorship 3.363
Periphery-Sponsorship 3.336
Hybrid 3.326
Mixing 3.307
Circle 1.691
Table 3.2: Total Welfare
In addition to this difference in linking behavior, none of the coordinated equilibria have
specialized investment strategies. The existence of such a specialized equilibrium depends
on the network architecture: It exists only for the center-sponsorship equilibrium, which
exhibits the most free-riding in link formation. For all other architectures are at most
partially specialized ; when forming many links, agents do not invest, but when forming only
one, they do. This is because coordination requires that the agents coordinating be making
a positive investment, so that there is some reason to coordinate. Thus, the only way agents
can coordinate in equilibrium is if they do not specialize.
3.5 Welfare
The welfare properties of the different equilibrium network architectures, for a particular
value k, for logarithmic utility and exponential costs, are presented in table 3.2. The center-
sponsorship equilibrium has the highest welfare, for any value of k. This is because this
equilibrium most efficiently separates the roles of investor and connector; a large amount of
free-riding on link formation means agents are relatively unable to free-ride on public good
investment, and must make their own investment more often. This leads to higher welfare.
The mixing equilibrium has lower welfare than the hybrid equilibrium for low k, but
higher welfare for high k; This is because the inefficiencies investment, due to randomness in
linking, disappear at a high k, when some investment is 0. The inefficiencies in the hybrid
equilibrium, due to complementarity in linking, becomes more evident in this case. The
circle equilibrium is again exceptional; because of the extreme coordination of links, there is
extreme free-riding in public good provision, and low welfare.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a model of network formation and public good provision, and char-
acterize the equilibrium networks and investment profiles. I find that specialization is only
possible for one equilibrium network, the center-sponsored star, and that for the others, due
to the complementarity of link formation, agents do not specialize. If investment in the pub-
lic good were complements, rather than substitutes, we may see that coordinated structures
have higher welfare. It would be interesting to see if the logic of the equilibrium with private
information, that the strategic nature of the linking decision has a strong influence on the
investment decision, can be extended to dynamic settings, or if the simultaneity in theses
decisions is what drives the results.
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CHAPTER 4
INFORMAL WORK NETWORKS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we develop a model of time allocation to formal and informal work, where
the informational structure of the informal sector leads to peer effects in labour provision,
and this effect is stronger in weaker institutional settings. The formal sector is competitive
and subject to taxation, while informal jobs are not taxed, but are subject to informational
frictions. Informal activities are driven by the social networks of workers. The informational
structure of the informal market follows Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson [19]. Workers learn
about informal job opportunities, and may pass this information to their peers. We char-
acterize the equilibrium time allocations, where formal and informal labour provision are
functions of taxation, enforcement, and the properties of the social network.1
In this setting, we introduce a very specific kind of heterogeneity among workers, both in
the transmission of job information from one worker to another, and heterogeneity over time
in the employment status of each worker’s peers. These two peer effects drive our results.
Peer effects are observed in the time allocation of those workers without an informal job.
Their informal time allocation is increasing in the probability that they receive informal job
information from one of their peers. Workers who already have an informal job do not take
social ties into account when choosing informal labour supply and allocate more time to
informal work than a worker without an informal job. Because workers who already have
an informal job may pass job information to their peers, formal labour supply is decreasing
in the number of peers with an informal job, while informal labour supply is increasing, for
workers without an informal job.
This model allows for the traditional explanations of informal work, i.e., taxation and
1This work will be published as “Informal Work Networks,” by Marcelo Arbex and Dennis O’Dea, in the
Candian Journal of Economics.
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institutional and enforcement conditions.2 We model the strength of the institutional envi-
ronment by the evasion detection probability. A lower detection probability reflects a weaker
institutional environment or, equivalently, a higher probability workers will keep their infor-
mal jobs. This may be due to corruption or the lack of appropriate instruments to enforce
tax obligations. In this environment informal work is more attractive, and peer effects are
stronger. Workers’ time allocation becomes more sensitive to the possibility of receiving job
information from their peers, and their chances of finding informal employment rise much
more from stronger social ties, than when institutions are stronger. In any environment,
stronger social ties improve the transmission of job information and increase utility.
We consider four network structures (empty, complete, star and wheel) to compare differ-
ent social structures and information transmission processes. We find that different networks
lead to differences in labour allocation, as well as differences in long run average income and
utility. Long run average income depends on two components: income earned in each state
of the economy and the long run probability of those states. The effect of institutional con-
ditions are reflected in changes to these two components. When the probability of being
detected working in the informal sector is low, workers increase the time they allocate to
that sector, which will increase the income earned in every state, for any network. It will
also change the likelihood of these states. This has an opposing effect on long run average
income. It becomes easier for agents to transition from no informal job to employment in
the informal sector and this increases the likelihood that, in any state, workers with informal
jobs start the period without them. Because agents who start a period without an informal
job allocate less time to informal work, this decreases long run average income. In well
connected networks, this later effect dominates the former effect because, in these networks,
informal jobs are easier to get and workers are more able to become employed in the informal
sector. Hence, even as weaker institutions lead workers to work more in the informal sector
and workers’ utility rises, in well connected networks long run average income falls.
It has long been understood that social ties are important in labour markets (see Gra-
novetter [36], and Ioannides and Loury [42] for a recent survey). Indeed, a large proportion
2Several works have studied the effects of government interventions, such as taxation and labour market
regulations (Banerjee and Andrew [9]; Johnson et al. [46], Friedman [29]; Schneider and Enste [67] ; Fugazza
and Jacques [30]) and the impact of bureaucracy, corruption and other institutional and enforcement condi-
tions on informal labour (Busato and Chiarini [18]; Choi and Thum [21]; Dabla-Norris [23]). Other studies
have argued that the heterogeneity of firms and entrepreneurs and limited access to capital markets are key
to explain the emergence of informal activities (Dessy and Pallage [24]; Gordon and Li [35]; Amaral and
Quintin [5]; Antunes and Cavalcanti [6]). This paper is also related, although not explicitly, to a great deal
of literature on tax evasion and social norms (see, for instance, Kirchler [49] and Lemieux and Frechette
[53]).
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of people (about 50% on average) hear about or obtain jobs through friends and relatives
(see Holzer [41], Montgomery [58], Topa [69], for the U.S., Gregg and Wadsworth [38], for the
U.K. and Addison and Portugal [2], for Portugal). Numerous studies have shown the impor-
tance of referrals and word of mouth for job search (See Bradshaw [16], Bortnick and Ports
[15], Blau [12], and Blau and Robins [13]). Such referrals come from a worker’s peers, family,
and co-workers. The nature of this social network can have a large impact on job search (see,
for instance, Munshi [59] for a study of Mexican immigrants in the United States). It is also
clear that usage of social networks varies along a variety of dimensions, such as gender, age,
education, ethnicity (see Bradshaw [16], Ports [61], Elliott [25]). The importance of social
connections for job search also varies by occupation (see Ioannides and Loury [42], Rees [64]
and JORGE and Valada˜o [47]). While many different forces might lead to distinct usage of
social networks, we focus in this paper on differences that are the result of frictions in job
search created by the different legal status of formal and informal labour.
Workers use alternative sources of information when searching for jobs. These can be
broadly classed as formal sources of information, such as job postings and placement agencies,
and informal sources of information, such as family, peers and coworkers. While formal work
may be found through formal and informal sources of information, there are no formal sources
of information for informal work. We interpret this asymmetry between the two sectors in
our model to be the result of legal frictions and the nature of informal activities that prevent
firms and workers from finding one another.3 Firms and workers must instead rely on word
of mouth, referrals and happenstance to find each other. This process will depend on the
social network of contacts, colleagues, friends and family of the worker. That is, information
on informal job opportunities arrives from peers and is passed from one agent to another in
a social network. It is natural, therefore, to model the market for informal work differently
than the market for formal work.
Social capital is especially important for informal activities. Close ties to neighbours,
friends and family members often play a role in the existence of such activities. Moreover,
informal networks are a potential source of economic support and are more likely to exist in
areas with stronger social networks (See Gaughan and Ferman [32], Losby [54] and Gerxhani
[33]). The informal economy consists of both self-employment and wage employment. Infor-
mal self-employment is usually part-time employment that provides a supplemental income
to people’s primary employment Alden [3]. This often involves switching between economic
sectors (formal and informal) during the same workday. Schneider and Enste [67] argue that
3Informal activites are defined as all income generating activities which do not comply with tax obligations,
tax evasion and non-compliance with legislation.
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the informal use of labour may consist of a second job after (or even during) regular working
hours. Ratner [63] argues that informal opportunities may derive from an agent being for-
mally employed and using the equipment and tools available, as well as access to consumers,
in its formal employment for informal work outside the hours of employment. Pedersen [60]
provides evidence that, in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom,
employment in the formal sector determines whether people carry out informal activities,
suggesting that workers build up an informal network of contacts in their formal job.
A common feature of the existing research on this topic is the absence of explicit and
formal treatment of informal activities as driven by social ties, ignoring peer effects or social
interactions effects. Despite some evidence, the economic literature of informal activities and
tax evasion is largely based on models of individuals deciding whether to carry out informal
activities where the taxpayer is assumed to be completely individualistic and amoral (see
Allingham and Sandmo [4], Cremer and Gahvari [22]; Lemieux and Frechette [53]; Slemrod
and S. [68]; Sandmo [65] and Cremer and Gahvari [22]).
The paper proceeds as follows: We present the basic model in section 4.2. In section 4.3,
we describe the model’s equilibria and we analyze a particular parameterization of our model
to illustrate our results. We also discuss the government’s optimal choice of tax-enforcement
policy instruments to maximize social welfare. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 The Model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of workers. Each worker has a utility function u(c, h), where
c is consumption and h is leisure. Each worker i must choose how much time to allocate
to work in the formal sector, li, and how much time to allocate to work in the informal
sector, γi. There are no technological differences between the two sectors of the economy.
The only differences are their informational structure and how the worker’s labour income
is taxed. There is an informational asymmetry between the two markets. The formal labour
market is competitive, so that workers can always find a formal job if they want one. The
informal market, on the other hand, is mediated by social networks. A worker must hear of
an informal job from his peers. Information about formal jobs is public and abundant, while
information about informal jobs is only passed from one person to another. If a worker hears
about a job, he will either take it himself, if he doesn’t already have an informal job, or he
will pass the job to one of his peers. We assume that, except for taxes, formal and informal
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jobs pay the same wage.4 Proceeds from taxation and enforcement are dissipated.
Time allocated to the informal sector may not necessarily be spent in work. If a worker is
not matched to an informal job or looses an informal job he already has, he may unwillingly
spend it on leisure. Our approach follows Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson [19] and we interpret
the timing as one where job break-up occurs, essentially, at the beginning of the period. We
track a worker’s informal employment status by a state variable Sit, where Sit = 1 for an
worker i employed in the informal sector and Sit = 0 for a worker without an informal job.
We write St = {S1t . . . Snt} as the vector containing every agent’s employment status at time
t.
A job contact network, or social network, is described by a symmetric matrix g, where
gij ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether a link exists between agents i and j. The symmetry of g reflects
the reciprocity of social ties. We will focus on a number of cases (Figure 1), where networks
have different structures and different forces shape the strength of social ties, as follows:
Case 1 (Empty) Let gij = 0 for all pairs of workers i and j. Job information received by
an agent will be either used by himself or discarded.
Case 2 (Complete) Let gij = 1 for all pairs ij. Every agent is directly connected to every
other agent. Informal job information each agent passes goes to each of his unemployed peers
with equal probability. This network features the strongest peer effects.
Case 3 (Star) Let gik = 0 for all agents k 6= j; let gij = 1 for every agent i 6= j. This
network is centered on agent j, who plays a central role in connecting otherwise unrelated
agents. Periphery agents can only receive job information from the center of the star, whose
ties are equally strong to all her peers. The center agent may receive information from any
of the periphery agents, and no other information is passed.
Case 4 (Wheel) Order agents from 1 to n, and let gik = 1 if i = k ± 1 modulo n, and
gik = 0 otherwise. Agents are connected to only two peers, forming a wheel. Agents can
only receive job information from their immediate neighbors in the network. They have no
access to job information from agents farther away in the social network, but also face little
competition for the information of their neighbors.
4The reason for this is to highlight the role of peer effects in time allocation between formal and informal
labour markets. Differences in wages between the two sectors lead to differences in time allocation, and
could easily be included in the model. This only clouds the impact of social networks, however.
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Figure 4.1: Network Structure Examples: Clockwise from upper left, a complete network, a
wheel network, an empty network, and a star network.
The informal job transmission process is described by a function pij : R
n → [0, 1], where
pij(St) gives the probability that a job originally heard by worker j is eventually received by
worker i when the state is St. We will assume that pij(St) is nondecreasing in every element
of St, i.e., the more workers have informal jobs, the more likely they are to pass information
about jobs. This might be, for example, because they pass jobs they themselves do not need.
The function
pij =


(1− Sit−1)α, i = j
(1− Sit−1)Sjt−1α gij∑
k|Sk;t−1=0
gjk
, i 6= j
0, otherwise.
describes the case where a worker i hears about an informal job himself with probability α
and is passed information from another worker j if j already has an informal job, hears about
one, and then passes him that information. The probability j does so is given by the relative
strength of the social ties between i and j, given by a function gij . This is the transmission
function considered in Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson [19]. Job information is only passed
“one step” along the job contact network in this example. Information that is not used by
its first recipient is lost. This is a simple kind of social network with peer effects, where the
prevalence of informal jobs is given by α, and the strength of the social ties between i and
j is given by a social network g.
If workers choose to work in the informal sector, they face some chance of detection by the
tax authorities. We model this by a parameter β, which gives the probability of detection,
determined by audit policies and monitoring procedures. In the event of detection, the worker
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loses his informal job and the opportunity to work in the informal sector that period.5 This
parameter can also be interpreted as the informal job break-up probability.
Workers face the following budget constraint:
cit ≤ lit(1− τ) + Sitγit, (4.1)
where consumption is produced in the formal and informal sector according to the constant
returns to scale production function y =
∑
i(lit + Sitγit). There is no savings in this model.
The sequence of events in a given period t is summarized in Table 4.1. The time allocation
decision is made at the beginning of period t and cannot be revised. Workers may hear of
new informal jobs, which they will either take themselves or pass to their peers. Workers
who either started the period with an informal job, or heard of one, are then detected with
probability β and may lose the chance to work in the informal sector, instead spending that
allocated time on leisure. Finally, workers work in the formal and informal sector, if they
have not been detected, and consume their income. If agent i is unemployed in the informal
sector at the start of period t, Sit−1 = 0. He will become employed if he hears of an informal
job and is not detected, in which case Sit = 1. Otherwise, Sit = 0.
Table 4.1: The sequence of events in period t
0 Sit−1 is given
1 Workers choose formal labour time allocation lit and informal time allocation γit
2 Workers hear about informal jobs with probability 1−∏j(1− pij(Sit−1))
3 Unemployed workers who hear of an informal job become matched
with that job, and workers carry out their labour.
4 All matched informal jobs are detected with probability β; Sit is now determined.
5 Workers with an informal job who are not detected receive income lit(1− τ) + γit.
Workers without an informal job or are detected, receive income lit(1− τ).
6 Workers consume their income and experience leisure.
Workers with an informal job and not caught experience leisure 1− lit − γit
Workers unmatched with an informal job experience leisure 1− lit.
5Although a more complex enforcement scheme could be considered, it would not change the results
substantively.
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4.3 Informal Work Networks
4.3.1 Network Structure and Information Transmission
An equilibrium of this model is a profile of time allocation choices {li, γi}ni=1 such that, given
l−i the profile of actions of workers besides i, and the state of nature St, ci, li, γi maximize
expected utility, with respect to S, for every worker i. Let St = {Sit}ni=1 be the vector of
employment states. We now write the worker’s dynamic problem as a function of this state
S.
V (St−1) = max
cit,lit,γit
ESU(cit, (1− lit − Sitγit) + δES[V (St)]
subject to (4.2)
cit ≤ lit(1− τ) + Sitγit
St =M(St−1, lit, γit, l−it, γ−it),
where M is the law of motion for St. Let K be the probability an agent has an informal
job in hand, prior to job breakup. Regardless of the social network, for a worker who starts
the period with an informal job in hand, called an “informal worker”, K = 1, and so his
peer’s employment status and the structure of the social network have no effect on his time
allocation decision. All an informal worker is concerned with is the possibility of detection,
β, and the tax rate, τ .
For a worker who starts the period without an informal job, called a “formal worker”, K
will in general depend on α, the employment status of the other agents, and the structure
of the social network g. Thus, an agent without an informal job, who has many peers who
may pass him information, and who has few competitors for that information, will allocate
more time to the informal sector than an agent with only a few peers to pass information or
many competitors for that information. His choices will exhibit peer effects.
The structure of social ties among workers determines the probability a formal worker
is passed job information. Conditional on being unemployed in the informal sector, the
probability worker i receives at least one offer is K = 1 − ∏j(1 − pij). The probability
that a worker unemployed in the informal sector finds an informal job and is not detected
is (1− β)K. Workers with different social networks and in different employment states face
decision problems that differ only through the function K.
For each of the networks we investigate, conditional on being unemployed in the informal
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sector, K is given by
K = 1− (1− α)
∏
j 6=i
(
1− Sjt−1α gij∑
k|Sk;t−1 gjk
)
. (4.3)
That is, the probability of being passed information depends on the structure of the
network g. For the empty network, gij = 0 for every pair of workers ij, where i 6= j. That
is, workers are not connected to one another. The probability a worker becomes employed
in the informal sector is simply α, the probability he hears of a job himself.
On the other extreme, the complete network, gij = 1 for all pairs of workers and social ties
are of equal strength between everyone. This network has the most information transmission.
If m is the number of peers of worker i who are informal workers, we have
pij = p
∗
Complete =
{
α, i = j;
Sjt−1 αn−m−1 , i 6= j.
The probability he receives information from an employed peer (a peer with an informal job)
depends on the number of competitors he has for that information, n−m− 1. Therefore,
K∗Complete = 1− (1− α)
(
1− α
n−m− 1
)m
,
for every worker without an informal job. Information may be passed from up to m other
workers.
In the star network there is a central agent with links to every other agent, and no other
links. Clearly, the center and the periphery agents will behave differently. The central agent
has access to the information of every periphery agent, and faces no competition for that
information, whereas periphery agents only have access to the center and may have many
competitors. For the center agent, the probability he receives informal job information from
some agent i on the periphery is given by
p∗Center =
{
α, If i has an informal job;
0, Otherwise.
If an agent on the periphery hears of an informal job, and if he does not use it himself, he
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can only pass it to the center. Therefore,
K∗Center = 1− (1− α)(1− α)m,
where m is the number of informal workers on the periphery. The probability he becomes
employed is much higher than, for example, any agent in the empty network. He may be
passed information from any of these m agents. For an agent on the periphery, however,
p∗Periphery =
{
α
n−1−m , If the center is an informal worker;
0, Otherwise.
The probability he is passed information from the center is lower, and is only positive in
the case where the center already has an informal job.6 When the center does not have an
informal job, no one else is passed any information. This is because the center will keep
any information he receives for himself. If multiple periphery agents have job information to
pass, those opportunities may be wasted in the star network. The equilibrium probability a
periphery agent receives job information is
K∗Periphery =
{
1− (1− α)(1− α
n−1−m), If the Center has an informal job;
α, Otherwise.
In the wheel network, the relevant state space of the network is larger. The probability
an agent receives job information depends not only on how many of his peers have informal
jobs, but how those peers are arranged. For instance, for the case n = 4, if m = 0 or
m = 3, where m is the number of a worker’s peers who are informal workers, there is no
ambiguity: there is only one way to arrange 0 or 3 agents on a circle, and every formal
worker is in the same situation. If m = 1, then an informal worker may be one of the two
agents adjacent to that informal worker, or not. If m = 2, these two agents may be adjacent
to each other, or not. These two arrangements will have different implications for formal
workers hoping to receive informal job information. If the two informal workers are adjacent,
than each informal worker may be passed information from only one of them, but he faces
no competition for that information. If the two informal workers are separated, then each
formal worker may get information from either of them, but now faces competition from the
6When there are four agents, a periphery agent can only have at most m = 1 peers who may pass her
information, but may have 0, 1 or 2 competitors for that information.
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other formal worker. Therefore,
p∗Wheel =


1− (1− α)2, If m = 3;
α, If m = 2 and they are adjacent;
2α(1−α)
2
+ α
2
4
, If m = 2 and they are separated;
α
2
, If m = 1 and the worker is adjacent;
0, If m = 1 and workers are separated ;
0, If m = 0.
And the probability an agent without an informal job learns about one is given by
K∗Wheel =


1− (1− α)3, If m = 3;
1− (1− α)2, If m = 2 and they are adjacent;
(1− α)(2α(1−α)
2
+ α
2
4
) + α, If m = 2 and they are separated;
(1− α)α
2
+ α, If m = 1, the formal worker is adjacent;
α, If m = 1, the formal worker is separated;
α, If m = 0.
4.3.2 Network Structure and Long Run Behavior
The state of the economy specifies how many agents have informal jobs, and how they are
arranged in the social network g. There are only finitely many such states, with a transition
matrix T determined by α, β, and the network structure g. Therefore, there is a unique
invariant distribution µ of the state.7
We illustrate the invariant distribution of these transition matrices, for the empty and
complete networks, in Figure 2. The regions of the unit square, corresponding to different
values of α and β, are shaded according to which state is likeliest for those values. State
behavior is similar in all networks. If the probability of detection β is close to 1, zero informal
workers is the most likely state. As α increases, the cutoff at which this state becomes the
likeliest increases. For lower values of β, states with more informal workers are more likely.
While these appear similar across networks, there are differences in these state probabilities.
For example, four informal workers are more likely in the complete network than the empty
7Such a distribution is guaranteed to exist because the transition matrix of the state is irreducible for α,
β ∈ (0, 1).
54
Figure 4.2: Most likely state in the long run for the Empty and Complete Networks
network for all values of α and β.
Because there is no savings, labour allocations depend only on the state of the economy,
so in each of these states a certain amount of time is allocated to the formal and informal
sectors. Taking the length of one period in the model to be a week, let F to be the vector of
time allocated by all agents to formal labour in each state k. Then, [(1/n)(1− τ)Fµ× 52]
is the long run average yearly income from the formal sector. Note that this depends on α,
β, τ and g through both the invariant distribution µ and the labour choices F .
Similarly, in every state, agents allocate a certain amount of time to the informal sector.
Unlike formal labour, however, the outcome of the informal labour market is uncertain.
The transition probabilities from state d are given by the column of the transition matrix,
Tj . For each initial state d, and final state k, a certain amount of time is allocated to
informal work, and a certain amount of income from informal work is actually earned. Let
I be the matrix of total informal labour performed for each possible state transition. Then
the average yearly income from the informal sector is given by [(1/n)(I ⊗ T )µ× 52] , where
(I ⊗ T ) gives the Hadamard product of I and T , a vector whose elements are the sum of the
elementwise product of the columns of I and T , which tells us the expected informal income
in each state. Multiplying this by µ, we have the long run average informal income. We can
calculate the long run average yearly utility of agents in a similar way, as well as the long
average total income agents earn.
Our model thus illustrates the importance of peer effects in worker’s decision to work in
the informal sector. When job information on informal work passes from worker to workers,
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through a social network, then peer effects will influence time allocation.
4.3.3 Time Allocation, Income, Utility and Network Structure
In order to illustrate the effects of changes in institutions and social networks on the economy,
we specify a particular utility function and social structure. We solve the model to find the
optimal time allocation to the formal and informal sectors, and illustrate the dynamics of
the economy. This allows us to evaluate the impact of network structures on time allocation,
income, and utility. We demonstrate that stronger social networks allow agents to better
exploit sources of information, leading to higher utility. Peer effects are stronger in weaker
institutional environments. We show that the weakening the enforcement of tax obligations,
while increasing the income a worker receives from informal work, may actually reduce
average income in the long run. The implicit welfare discussion in this section is strictly
from a worker’s point of view.
We solve the model assuming that the utility function is of the form
u(c, h) = c1/2h1/2,
We set n = 4 and we consider the simplest setting with four distinct networks.
The job transmission function p depends on a job arrival probability α and the strength
of social ties between workers, gij. The effects of changes in α and g can be discerned by
their effect on pij. A rise in α will increase pij, and so increase time allocated to the informal
sector. If the social ties between i and j become stronger, information is more likely to be
passed from j to i. If another worker k’s ties to j become stronger, then because i and k are
competitors for j’s information, pij decreases, and so time allocated to informal work falls.
The comparative statics of the equilibrium labour choices are examined for different net-
works and different states. It is clear that the relative values of τ and β and the attitude of
workers toward risk is relevant for these choices, because workers are balancing the tradeoff
between working in the formal sector, subject to the tax τ , and working in the informal
sector, subject to the risky lottery of the job matching process (α, β, g). We observe that,
regardless of the network structure, time allocated to formal (informal) work is decreasing
(increasing) in the arrival probability α and in the income tax τ . Formal labour supply is
increasing in the detection probability β, while hours worked in the informal sector decrease
as the probability of detection increases. Workers who start the period with an informal job
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in hand allocate more time to informal work than a worker who does not. Because they are
sure to be able to engage in informal work, they set aside more time to do so.
Differences in the networks lead to differences in K, the probability an unemployed agent
learns of a job opportunity, which leads to differences in the equilibrium time allocation of
informal workers. Let lE be the formal labour supply of a worker employed in an informal
job and lU(m) is the formal labour supplied by a worker not employed in an informal job
when he has m peers employed in the informal sector. In each network structure, informal
workers always work less in the formal sector than formal workers.
The informal time allocation of an informal worker, γE, and of a formal worker without
any peers who may pass information (that is, when m = 0), γU(0), represent the highest
and lowest time allocation to informal work, respectively. For all other networks and states,
time allocation will be between these two extremes. The more peers a formal worker has
who may pass him informal job information, the more his time allocated to informal labour
approaches the time allocation of a worker who already has an informal job. That is, formal
worker’s time allocations exhibit peer effects.
Increasing the probability workers are caught evading taxes (β) will discourage informal
work and lead agents to allocate more time to formal work. Formal workers allocate less time
to informal work, and more to formal work. Differences in labour time allocation between
the networks are larger. Consider a formal worker with one peer employed in the informal
sector. Besides the fact that he works less in the formal sector, he works much less if there
are no peer effects (as in the empty network) than when there are strong peer effects (as
in the complete network). This shows that the effects of the network structure and the
information transmission mechanism are stronger when institutions are weaker. When the
detection probability β is low, a worker is more likely to keep his informal job and so he cares
relatively more about informal job opportunities. Thus, in an economy where enforcement
is weaker, social ties matter more and workers alter their behavior in order to influence their
chance of getting an informal job. That is, the informal job information transmission process
becomes more important in an environment where informal jobs do not break up easily.
The effects of changes in income taxation on time allocated to formal and informal work
are simple: when taxes are lower, agents will allocated more time to the informal sector. For
any network, and any state, as τ goes to one, time allocation to formal work goes to zero.
Conversely, as τ goes to zero, time allocation to informal work goes to 0.5.8 The various
networks and states differ only in how quickly agents reduce their time allocation to formal
8This is an artifact of the utility function, so that 0.5 is the most time ever allocated to any sector.
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work. The more peers an agent has who may pass information, and the more conducive to
information transmission the network is, the more responsive time allocations are to changes
in τ . Figures 3− 5 illustrate the informal labour supply choices with respect to the arrival
probability, probability detection and income tax, respectively.
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Figure 4.3: Informal Labour Supply and Arrival Probability α
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Figure 4.4: Informal Labour Supply and Probability of Detection β
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Figure 4.5: Informal Labour Supply and Income Tax τ
If a worker’s peers do not have informal jobs (that is, if m = 0), formal and informal time
allocations are the same for every network. Without peers who may pass you information,
every structure is equivalent to the empty network. As more peers become employed in the
informal sector, formal workers allocate less time to formal work, and more time to informal
work. In other words, for formal workers (those who start the period without informal
jobs), formal labour supply is decreasing in the number of peers with an informal job, and
conversely, informal labour supply is increasing in the number of peers with an informal
job. If the number of peers working in the informal sector is small, a formal worker is in
competition with other peers for the information about new informal job opportunities.
We also investigate the impact of changes in α, β and τ on long run average total formal
and informal income, and utility for each of the network structures. Total and formal incomes
and utility are decreasing in income tax τ , while the informal labour income increases as
the income tax rate increases. As taxes increase, workers allocated less time to the formal
sector, and earn less income from the time they do allocate. At the same time, they allocate
more time to the informal sector, which increases their informal income. This increase does
not fully replace their lost formal income, leading to a drop in total income and utility.
Income and utility are relatively constant with respect to the arrival probability α. Formal
income is increasing in the probability of detection. Facing an increasing probability of being
detected working in the informal sector, a worker reduces his informal labour supply and
increases his time allocated to formal work. On the other hand, informal income is more
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sensitive to an increase in this probability and falls sharply as the chances of being caught
working in the informal sector increases, reducing the worker’s total income and utility.
Figure 6 shows that depending on the network structure total income is not monotonically
decreasing in the detection probability. This is the case for the complete and wheel networks.
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Figure 4.6: Long Run Average Total Income and Probability of Detection β
The effects of changes in α, β, τ and network structure g on long run average income and
utility depend on the interaction between changes in labour allocation, the distribution over
states, and state transition probabilities. The dynamics of the economy and the importance
of peer effects are especially apparent in the long run behavior of the model.
Consider, for instance, a baseline economy where the formal tax rate, job arrival probability
and detection probability are as follows: τ = 0.25, α = 0.10 and β = 0.70, respectively. These
values meant to resemble an economy with strong tax enforcement environment. Given
labour allocations in each state, and the long run probabilities of those states, the average
long run yearly formal income, informal income, total income, and utility are presented in
Table 4.2 for each of the four networks.
Note that while total income is the highest in the star network, utility is the lowest.
Income is the lowest in the complete network, but utility is the highest. To understand this
counterintuitive result, compare the complete network when two agents have an informal job,
to the star network when two periphery agents have an informal job. Consider a transition
to a state where, again, only two agents have informal jobs. This may be accomplished in
a number of ways. Either the agents who start with the informal jobs keep them, or some
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Table 4.2: Long Run Averages for the baseline economy: τ = 0.25, α = 0.10, β = 0.70.
Empty Star Wheel Complete
Total Income 19.5209 19.5218 19.4703 19.4806
Formal Income 19.3671 19.3620 19.3556 19.3654
Informal Income 0.1538 0.1598 0.1146 0.1151
Utility 22.5277 22.5217 22.5281 22.5281
of the agents without informal jobs find one, and agents who start with a job lose it. In the
star network, the latter scenario is much more unlikely than it is in the complete network.
Only the center agent can pass information to the two unemployed periphery agents, and
only the center agent can profit from the information of the employed periphery agents. In
the complete network, however, both unemployed agents (i.e., without an informal job) may
receive information from both of their employed peers.
This change in state transition probabilities means that when the star network is in a state
with many agents employed in the informal sector, it is very likely that those agents started
the period already employed in the informal sector. Because agents who start employed in
the informal sector allocate more time to that sector, expected average informal income will
be higher than in the complete network. Due to the easier transmission of information in
the complete network, agents who find themselves working in the informal sector may have
started that period without an informal job, and so have allocated less time to informal
work. But, the changes in state transition probabilities also change the long run distribution
over states, µ. The economy spends more time in states where agents have informal jobs
under the complete network that it will under the star network. Average long run informal
income is lower, even as workers are more likely to have informal jobs.
The overall effect is that the more connected networks (the wheel and the complete net-
work) feature lower income but higher utility than the less connected networks (the star and
empty network). The star network, despite being advantageous for the central agent, is little
better than the empty network in how it transmits information.
We also investigate the impact of different institutions, such as weaker enforcement, on
long run average income and utility. Consider an alternative economy, where we keep the
job arrival probability and tax rate as in our baseline economy (α = 0.10, τ = 0.25), but the
detection probability is lower (β = 0.30). This captures an environment where enforcement
is more lax due to corruption, weaker institutions or lack of appropriate policy instruments
to fight informal activities. The average long run yearly income and utility are presented in
Table 4.3 for each of the four networks.
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Table 4.3: Long Run Averages for the alternative economy: τ = 0.25, α = 0.10, β = 0.30.
Empty Star Wheel Complete
Total Income 19.7412 19.7788 19.2913 19.3617
Formal Income 18.1504 17.9429 17.8474 17.9330
Informal Income 1.5908 1.8360 1.4439 1.4287
Utility 22.6323 22.6296 22.6552 22.6550
First, note that formal income is lower in the alternative economy than in the baseline
economy, informal income is higher, and utility is higher, for any network. This is because
in the alternative economy, due to lax enforcement, workers allocate more time to informal
labour and less time to formal labour. Because they face a smaller chance of detection in
the informal sector, their utility must necessarily rise in equilibrium. Since detection is still
possible, however, the informal sector is still risky, and the lost income from the formal sector
is not fully replaced by the work performed in the informal sector, and total income may fall.
In the wheel and complete network, this is what occurs. For precisely the same reason that
income is lower in the complete network than in the star, while utility is higher, income is
lower in the alternative economy for the wheel and complete networks, while utility is higher.
Lower detection probabilities make it easier for agents with jobs to keep them, but do not
make it easier for agents without jobs to find them. And, in any given state, it is still likely
that those who end up with informal jobs are those who started with them. Thus, a more
lax enforcement environment, while associated with more time allocated to a higher earning
sector, may lead to less income.
Long run utility rises not only due to the greater ease of obtaining informal work, and
the resulting higher income that may be earned by a worker without an informal job,9 but
also due to a greater ability to smooth labour choices, and enjoy leisure. In states with
the greatest information transmission, the complete and wheel network, agents face the least
uncertainty in their labour decision. The change in utility from the baseline to the alternative
economy is the largest in the wheel and complete network, and the smallest in the star and
empty network. Weaker institutions matter more in more connected social networks. In the
wheel and complete network, agents are more able to benefit from lax enforcement of labour
laws than in the star and empty networks.
9As was shown previously, long run average income falls, but for a particular agent without an informal,
easier job transmission will increase her expected income.
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4.3.4 Government Policy Instruments and Network Structure
In the analysis to this point, tax and enforcement policy instruments have been treated as
given. But as policy instruments, the government may choose them optimally to maximize
agents’ welfare. In this section, we allow the social planner to choose the best combination
of tax and enforcement instruments (τ, β) that maximize social welfare, defined here as the
sum of agents’ utility in this economy.
Let (ci(τ, β), li(τ, β), γi(τ, β)) denote the solution of a social planner’s problem for a fixed
tax-enforcement policy (τ, β) and U(τ, β) denotes the corresponding values of the utility
function. Consider the following problem of optimal tax-enforcement policy:
max
τ,β
∑
i
ES[U(ci(τ, β), li(τ, β), γi(τ, β))].
Let (τ ∗, β∗) and U∗ = U(τ ∗, β∗) be the solution of this problem and the corresponding value
of the utility function, respectively. We introduce functions τ(β) and β(τ) as follows. For
any fixed τ ∈ [0, 1], define β(τ) to be the best level of detection probability, i.e.
max
β
∑
i
ES[U(τ, β)] =
∑
i
ES[U(τ, β(τ))].
And, similarly, for any fixed β ∈ [0, 1], define τ(β) to be the best level of tax rate, i.e.
max
τ
∑
i
ES[U(τ, β)] =
∑
i
ES [U(τ(β), β)].
These functions satisfy β(τ ∗) = β∗ and τ(β∗) = τ ∗.
We characterize numerically the optimal tax-enforcement policy (τ ∗, β∗) when the govern-
ment has to raise an exogenously given revenue and the cost of auditing the informal sector
varies. Let βA the cost of auditing, where A is a fixed unit cost of audits. This cost can be
interpreted as the government using some of the tax revenue raised from the formal sector in
enforcement. If tax-enforcement is costless (A = 0), the optimal policy is to set the detec-
tion probability to its maximum level, i.e., β∗ = 1, and the formal tax rate to the minimum
amount needed to raise the required revenue. In this case, given that auditing is costless and
formal taxation is distortionary, the optimal policy would require taxing inelastic variables
more heavily and so a low τ - high β policy is welfare enhancing. This result is robust
regardless of the network structure and workers’ risk aversion. For all network structures
we study, the optimal detection probability is β∗ = 1. That is, it is socially optimal for the
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planner to shut down the informal sector.
Figure 7 shows the social welfare U(τ, β) for various levels of the tax rate τ and probability
of detection β when the audit cost is zero (A = 0), for the empty network. In any network,
for different levels of expected revenue, there are different combinations of (τ, β) that raise
that expected revenue, but only one tax-enforcement policy pair that maximizes welfare,
i.e., the optimal combination (τ ∗, β∗). In the figure we highlight the set of (τ, β) that are
optimal for different levels of revenue for the empty network. For instance, to raise 0.2 in
expected revenue, (τ ∗, β∗) = (0.1, 1.0) is the optimal policy (this (τ ∗, β∗) pair is indicated by
the arrow in Figure 7).
However, when audit costs are positive (A > 0), auditing everybody is no longer optimal.
In fact, the optimal detection probability β declines and the optimal tax rate τ increases as
the audit cost rises. In this case, for an empty network with audit costs of A = 0.05, the
optimal policy is to set τ ∗ = 0.12 and β∗ = 0.98, if the planner has to raise an expected
revenue of 0.20. If auditing is costly, the agent’s risk aversion is relevant for the determination
of the optimal tax-enforcement policy. If agents are risk averse, a small probability of
detection would be enough to discourage agents from working in the informal sector. This
allows the planner to set a smaller β and a lower τ , in order to maximize the social welfare.
On the other hand, if agents are risk neutral, a larger tax rate and a higher detection
probability are the optimal policy.10
4.4 Conclusions
The importance of social ties to labour market outcomes has been long understood. This
paper formally models the effect of network structure on time allocation and informal work.
It is flexible enough to accommodate many different social structures, but simple enough
to generate empirical predictions. In our social network model, we explore how peer effects
interact with two well emphasized determinants of informal activities - tax burden and
institutional quality. When enforcement is weaker, social ties matter more and workers are
more responsive to the strength of social ties. The informal job information transmission
process is more important in an environment with weaker enforcement. The institutional
environment determines the importance of peer effects for labour time allocation. Workers
allocate more time to informal activities in the presence of lax enforcement and better job
10Results for the other networks are available from the authors upon request.
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information transmission. Further analysis of the different network structures may provide
insights into different social institutions. Features such as social norms and fairness could be
easily introduced in our analysis, for instance, via frictions in the transmission of information
about informal activities opportunities. We leave this for future research.
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Figure 4.7: Long Run Average Welfare in the Empty Network
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
[Proofs]
Proof of Proposition 1
There are three cases to consider.
1.
∑
i θi > c. Suppose that a graph g is efficient, and that it is not a minimal connected
graph. First, suppose it is not minimal. Then there is some component C of g that
contains a link that could be deleted without disconnecting the component. Because
utility does not decay across links, the value received by the agents in the component
would not decrease when this link is deleted, but the agent who is initiating it would
see her costs decrease. This would increase utility, contradicting the network being
efficient. Now suppose the graph is not connected. Then let there bem ≥ 2 components
of the graph, that are disconnected. Let C1, . . . , Cm be these components, and let
n1, . . . , nm be the number of agents in each one. Consider connecting these components,
each via a single link. The change in utility is
m∑
j=1
(
∑
k 6=j
nk)
∑
i∈Cj
θi − (m− 1)c. (A.1)
That is, each agent i in component Cj now has a path to every agent in the other
components. There are
∑
k 6=j nk such agents, and i receives θi for each one. This is
then summed over components. Let nmax be the size of the largest component. Then,
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from (A.1),
(
m∑
j=1
(
∑
k 6=j
nk)
∑
i∈Cj
θi)− (m− 1)c = (
m∑
j=1
(n− nj)
∑
i∈Cj
θi)− (m− 1)c
= (
m∑
j=1
∑
i∈Cj
nθi)− (
m∑
j=1
∑
i∈Cj
njθi)− (m− 1)c
= n
∑
i
θi − (
m∑
j=1
nj
∑
i∈Cj
θi)− (m− 1)c.
The size of component Cj, nj , is necessarily less than nmax. The maximum size of
nmax is n − (m − 1). This is largest possible component if there are m components.
Therefore, nj ≤ n− (m− 1). We therefore have
n
∑
i
θi − (
m∑
j=1
nj
∑
i∈Cj
θi)− (m− 1)c ≥ n
∑
i
θi − (
m∑
j=1
(n− (m− 1))
∑
i∈Cj
θi)− (m− 1)c
= n
∑
i
θi − (n− (m− 1))
∑
i
θi − (m− 1)c+ nc− nc
= n(
∑
i
θi − c)− (n− (m− 1))(
∑
i
θi − c) > 0.
The final inequality follows because
∑
i θi > c and n > n− (m− 1). Connecting these
components increased total utility, so the original graph g could not have been efficient.
Conversely, if a graph g is minimal and connected, it must be efficient. It cannot be
that adding links increase utility, as this does not change the value any agent receives
from the network, and only increases linking costs. Deleting a link will necessarily
disconnect the network, since it is minimal, and the argument above shows that any
disconnected network is not efficient. Therefore, a network is efficient if and only if it
is a minimal connected graph.
2.
∑
i θi = c. If
∑
i θi = c, the total utility for a minimal connected graph is zero, as is
the value of an empty graph. To see that such a graph is efficient, suppose a graph
g is efficient, and is neither empty nor a minimal connected graph. g must contain a
non-empty component C with m ≤ n agents, and from the no decay assumption, C is
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connected with exactly m− 1 links. The total utility of the agents in C is therefore
(m− 1)(
∑
i∈C
θi − c) <(m− 1)(
∑
i
θi − c) = 0,
so that aggregate utility is less than either the empty network or a minimal connected
network. Thus, g could not have been efficient. Conversely, this argument shows that
if a graph is either empty or a minimal complete graph, it is efficient.
3.
∑
i θi < c. If
∑
i θi < c, a network is efficient if and only if it is empty. Suppose
a network is efficient, but not empty. Then there is a component Cj with nj > 1
members. The aggregate utility of all the agents in this component is at most
(nj − 1)
∑
i∈Cj
θi − (nj − 1)c.
This can be simplified to
(nj − 1)
∑
i∈Cj
θi − (nj − 1)c = (nj − 1)(
∑
i∈Cj
θi − c)
< (nj − 1)(
∑
i
θi − c) < 0,
where the last inequality follows by hypothesis. Thus no efficient graph can be nonempty.
In contrast, if a graph is empty, it must be efficient. Adding a link would create a non-
trivial component, and the argument above shows that any non-trivial component is
necessarily inefficient. Therefore a network is efficient if and only if it is the empty
graph.
Proof of Proposition 3
I exhaustively characterize the equilibria of the 3 agent case in five lemmas. I establish in
Lemma 1 that the only equilibria in which agents use mixed strategies are the two hybrid
equilibria, and the full mixing equilibrium. In Lemma 2, I show that if agents use only pure
strategies, then the only equilibrium in which all three agents, for some positive measure of
types, form only a single link is the symmetric circle equilibrium. In Lemma 3, I show that if
agents use only pure strategies, then the only equilibrium in which exactly two agents form
a single link, for some positive measure of types, is the periphery-sponsorship equilibrium.
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In Lemma 4, I show that if agents use only pure strategies, then there is no equilibrium in
which only a single agent forms a single link for some positive measure her types. In Lemma
5, I show that the only equilibria in which agents use only pure strategies and no agent ever
forms only a single link, are the various center-sponsorship equilibria. This exhaustively
characterizes all the equilibria of the three agent case with uniform values.
It is easy to see that equilibrium strategies must be monotone in types; if it a best response
for an agent of type θ to form two links, it cannot be a best response for the same agent,
when her type is θ′ > θ, to form only one link. This implies the existence of critical types,
cutoffs where agents are indifferent between forming zero or one link, and one or two links.
In some strategies, agents may form zero links for a low range or types, one link for an
intermediate range, and two links for a higher range or her type. We will say an agent’s
strategy places positive weight on an action if for some positive measure of her type space
she performs that action.
Let δ01i denote the cutoff used by agent i between forming zero links, and one link, and δ
12
i
denote the cutoff used by agent i between forming one link and two links; that is, these are the
critical types of an agent who in equilibrium must be indifferent between those two actions.
Because types are drawn from the uniform distribution, the ex ante probability agent i forms
zero links is F (δ01i ) = δ
01
i , the probability she forms 1 link is F (δ
12
i ) − F (δ01i ) = δ12i − δ01i ,
and the probability she forms two links is 1 − F (δ12i ) = 1 − δ12i . Let pij be the probability
that agent i links to agents j, when agent i is mixing in forming a single link to either j or
k. Be definition, pik = 1− pij , so in what follows, only one of these variables will be referred
to. I will only refer to pij , pjk and pki.
Lemma 1 The only equilibria in which agents mix are hybrid equilibria, one in which the
nonmixing agents place positive weight on forming two links, and one in which she does not,
and the full mixing equilibria, in which all three agents mix when forming their single link.
Proof.
Step 1. I first characterize the mixing equilibrium, when all three players mix. If all three
players mix, then 6 indifference conditions must be satisfied. Each agent must be indifferent
between their actions when mixing, forming a single link to one or the other agent, and there
is a cutoff value for each agent where she is indifferent between zero links and one link. This
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leads to the following system of equations:
1 − δ
01
k +
(
1 − δ
12
j
)
δ
01
k +
(
−δ
01
j + δ
12
j
)
δ
01
k pjk = 1 − δ
01
j + δ
01
j
(
1 − δ
12
k
)
+ δ
01
j
(
−δ
01
k + δ
12
k
)
(1 − pki) ,
1 − δ
01
i + δ
01
i
(
1 − δ
12
k
)
+ δ
01
i
(
−δ
01
k + δ
12
k
)
pki = 1 − δ
01
k +
(
1 − δ
12
i
)
δ
01
k +
(
−δ
01
i + δ
12
i
)
δ
01
k
(
1 − pij
)
,
1 − δ
01
i + δ
01
i
(
1 − δ
12
j
)
+ δ
01
i
(
−δ
01
j + δ
12
j
) (
1 − pjk
)
= 1 − δ
01
j +
(
1 − δ
12
i
)
δ
01
j +
(
−δ
01
i + δ
12
i
)
δ
01
j pij ,
δ
01
i =
c(
−δ12
j
δ01
k
+ 2δ01
j
δ12
k
− δ01
j
δ01
k
pjk + δ
12
j
δ01
k
pjk − 2δ
01
j
δ12
k
pjk + 2δ
12
j
δ12
k
pjk +
(
δ01
k
− δ12
k
) (
δ01
j
(
3 − 2pjk
)
+ 2δ12
j
pjk
)
pki
) ,
δ
01
j =
c(
2δ12
i
δ01
k
− δ01
i
δ12
k
+ 2δ01
i
δ01
k
pij − 3δ
12
i
δ01
k
pij + δ
01
j
δ01
k
pij +
(
−δ01
k
+ δ12
k
) (
δ01
i
− 2δ12
i
(
−1 + pij
)
+ 2δ01
i
pij
)
pki
) ,
δ
01
k =
c(
−δ12
i
δ01
j
+ 2δ01
i
δ12
j
− δ01
i
δ01
j
pij + δ
12
i
δ01
j
pij − 2δ
01
i
δ12
j
pij + 2δ
12
i
δ12
j
pij +
(
δ01
j
− δ12
j
) (
δ01
i
(
3 − 2pij
)
+ 2δ12
i
pij
)
pjk
)
The first of these equations is an indifference condition; agents of the critical types must
be indifferent between forming no links and mixing in forming a single link, and agents
of whatever type who mix in forming a single link must be indifferent among whom she
may form that link to. There are many solutions to this system that are consistent with
equilibrium. For example, there is a symmetric equilibrium, in which each agent uses the
same mixing probability and the same cutoff. In this case the mixing probabilities are each
1
2
, and the equilibrium cutoff is
δ01 =
(
9c+
√
3
√
1 + 27c2
)1/3
32/3
− 1
31/3
(
9c+
√
3
√
1 + 27c2
)1/3 .
Agents form a single link at random if their value exceeds this cutoff, and form no links if
their value is below it. It is not possible for any agent to place positive weight on forming
two links in these equilibria. If any agent does, then the others will prefer to form two
links themselves rather than one; that is, they will prefer to deviate to center-sponsored
equilibrium.
Step 2. Next, I eliminate the possibility that only two agents mix when forming a single
link, in equilibrium. By contradiction, suppose that exactly two agents do mix. When two
agents are mixing, they must each be indifferent between linking to the other mixing agent,
and linking to the agent who is not mixing. Suppose that i and j are mixing, and consider
their indifference conditions when mixing:
δ01j =
δ12j δ
01
k (1− pjk)
δ12k pki + δ
01
k (1− pjk − pki)
δ01i =
δ12i δ
01
k pij
δ01k pij − δ01k pkj + δ12k pkj
Because by hypothesis agent k is not mixing, then either pki = 0, pjk = 0, or both. That is,
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agent k can form a single link to one or the other, or not form a single link at all. But this
means that at least one of pki and pjk must be zero. Suppose without loss of generality that
pki = 0. Substituting this into the above indifference condition, δ
01
j = δ
12
j , which contradicts
the hypothesis that agent j places positive weight on forming a single link. Therefore, this
cannot be an equilibrium.
Step 3. Finally, suppose only one agent uses mixed strategies in equilibrium. Without
loss of generality, let this be agent i. I will show that the architecture of this equilibrium
must be the hybrid structure. In this structure all three agents place positive weight on
forming a single link. Agent i mixes in forming her single link to the others, while agent j
and agent k form a single link to each another.
First, suppose that all three agents place positive weight on forming a single link. The
possible arrangements of these links are a periphery-sponsorship structure, where k and j
form their single link to agent i, a chain, where k links to j, who links to i, and the hybrid
structure. I will first show that the periphery sponsorship structure cannot be an equilibrium.
Suppose that agents j and k are both directing their single link to agent i, who is mixing
between the two of them with her single link. For agent j to prefer to link to agent i over k,
it must be that i does not place any weight on linking to agent j. This is because, otherwise,
a link to agent k would be preferable: It would yield a certain connection to k and a possible
connection to i, while a link to i yields a certain connection to i and a possible connection
to k, but the likelihood of this latter connection is smaller than the possible connection to
i. To see this, note that j’s expected utility from a link to i is
θj − c+ θj(1− δ01k (δ01i + (δ12i − δ01i )pij)),
while the utility from a link to agent k is
θj − c + θj(1− δ01k δ01i ).
She strictly prefers a link to k, unless either (δ12i −δ01i ) = 0, which contradicts the hypothesis
that i places positive weight on forming a single link, or pij = 0, which contradicts the
hypothesis that i is mixing.
To eliminate the chain architecture as a possible equilibrium, suppose without loss of
generality that agent k forms her link to agent j, who forms her link to agent i, who mixes.
For i to be indifferent between linking to either of the other two agents, it must be that
δ01j = 1, which contradicts our hypothesis that agent j places positive weight on forming one
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link. To see this, note that the expected utility to agent i of a link to agent j is
θi − c+ θi(1− δ01k ),
and the expected utility from a link to k is
θi − c + θi(1− δ01k δ01j ).
The result is immediate. This holds whether the other agents form one or two links.
Therefore the chain architecture cannot be an equilibrium; this leaves only the hybrid, where
two agents form a single link to each other, and the third mixes in his single link to them.
Step 4. To conclude, I characterize the hybrid equilibria. Let agent i be the mixing
agent. I now show that all three agents cannot place positive weight on forming two links.
Suppose otherwise; such an equilibrium must satisfy the following indifference conditions,
corresponding to each agent’s indifference between zero and one link, one and two links, and
the mixing agent’s indifference:
δ01i =
(
c
2 δ12j δ
12
k
− δ01j δ01k
)
,
δ12i =
c
δ01j δ
01
k
,
δ01j =
(
c
δ12i δ
01
k pik − δ01i + δ12i δ01k + δ01i δ12k − δ01i δ01k pik
)
,
δ01k =
c
−δ01i − δ01j + 2 δ12i δ01j + δ01i δ12j + δ01i δ01j pik − δ12i δ01j pik
,
δ12j =
c
δ01i
,
δ12k =
c
δ01i
.
This system of equations has three candidate solutions.1 First, there is one that requires
that δ01k = 1, which contradicts our hypothesis that agent k is forming links, and cannot
be an equilibrium. Second, there is one that requires that agent i’s mixing probabilities be
imaginary, which also cannot be an equilibrium.
In the third candidate solution, I now show that there is no mixing probability pik that
satisfies the solution of this system, and is consistent with equilibrium. This solution requires
1This was determined using Mathematica.
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that
δ01k =
(1− pik)
(1− 2pik + 2p2ik)
.
This requires that pik be at least
1
2
, in order for δ01k to be less than one. The solution also
requires that either
δ01j =
1
δ01k
or
δ01j = 1− δ01k + 2δ01k pik
which both require that pik be at most
1
2
, so that δ01j be less than one. So pik =
1
2
, but at
this value δ01j = δ
01
k = 1, which contradicts the hypothesis that a positive measure of types
of both agents j and k form a single link. Hence, this solution cannot be an equilibrium.
Therefore, there is no solution to this system of equations that is consistent with equilibrium.
Therefore, it cannot be that all three agents place positive weight on forming two links.
Suppose now that only agent i, who is mixing, places positive weight on forming two links,
and the others do not. Such an equilibrium must satisfy the following indifference conditions:
δ01j =
c
δ01k (δ
12
i − δ01i pik + δ12i pik)
,
δ01k =
c
δ01j (−δ01i + 2 δ12i + δ01i pik − δ12i pik)
,
δ01i =
(
c
2− δ01j δ01k
)
,
δ12i =
c
δ01j δ
01
k
.
This system of equations has only one solution, which requires that δ01i = δ
12
i = c. This
contradicts our hypothesis that agent i places positive weight on forming one link, so this
solution cannot be an equilibrium.
It is clear that it cannot be that agent i that places positive weight on forming two links,
while only one of agents j or k do; agent i will strictly prefer to link to the other agent,
rather than mix. Suppose next that either agent j or k, and possibly both, place positive
weight on forming two links, while the mixing agent does not. Then an equilibrium must
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satisfy the following equations:
δ01i =
c
2 (δ12j )
2 − (δ01j )2
,
δ01j = δ
01
k =
−2 c
−3 δ01j + 2 δ01i + δ01j δ01i − 2 δ12j δ01i
,
δ12j = δ
12
k =
c
δ01i
.
This requires that both agents j and k place positive weight on forming two links. There
are multiple solutions to this system that represent equilibria. This characterizes the hybrid
equilibria where the non-mixing agents place positive weight on forming two links.
Suppose finally that no agent places positive weight on forming two links. The system
of indifference equations such an equilibrium must satisfy, representing indifference between
forming zero and one link, and indifference in mixing:
δ01i =
c
2− δ01j δ01k
,
δ01j =
c
δ01k (1 + pik − δ01i pik)
,
δ01k =
c
δ01j (2− δ01i − pik + δ01i pik)
.
The solution to this requires that pik =
1
2
, δ01i =
6−c−√36−36 c+c2
4
and
δ01i =
3 δ01j δ
01
k
4− δ01j δ01k
.
There is a continuum of such equilibria. This characterizes the hybrid equilibria where the
non-mixing agents do not place positive weight on forming two links. This shows that when
all three agents place positive weight on forming one link, the only equilibrium structure
with mixing is a hybrid equilibrium.
Step 5. I next eliminate the cases where only one or two agents place positive weight
on forming one link. I must show that when only one agent is mixing, it cannot be that
only two agents, the mixer and one other, are placing positive weight on forming one link
in equilibrium. Suppose first that agent j, the non-mixing agent, is placing positive weight
on forming a single link, and this link is formed to agent k. I now show that none of these
agents may place positive weight on forming two links in equilibrium. If agent i places
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positive weight on forming two links, the following indifference conditions, corresponding to
indifference for critical types and indifference in mixing, must hold:
δ01i =
c(
2δ12j − δ01j
)
δ02k
,
δ12i =
c
δ01j δ
02
k
,
δ01j =
c
δ02k (δ
12
i − δ01i pik + δ12i pik)
.
These imply that δ12j = δ
01
j , a contradiction. If j places positive weight on forming two
links, the following indifference conditions must hold:
δ01i =
c(
2δ12j − δ01j
)
δ02k
,
δ12i =
c
δ01j δ
02
k
,
δ12j =
c
δ01i δ
02
k
.
These also imply that δ12j = δ
01
j . Using this, we write the indifference conditions that must
be satisfied if agent k places positive weight on two links:
δ01i =
c(
2− δ01j
)
δ02k
,
δ01j =
c
δ02k (1− δ01i pik + pik)
,
δ02k =
2c
δ01i
(
1 + δ01j pik
)− δ01i 2 − δ01j (−2 + pik) .
There are three candidate solutions to this system of equations, none of which can be an
equilibrium. In the first, pik = −1, which is not an equilibrium. In the second, pik = 1 or 0,
which contradicts agent i mixing. In the third, either δ01j = 1, which is a contradiction, or
δ01j =
1−5pik
3(pik−1)pik , which does not depend on c, and so cannot be an equilibrium for sufficiently
high c. Therefore all agents place zero weight on forming two links. But in this case, agent k
prefers to deviate and form a link to agent i. To see this, note that the indifference conditions
by i and j imply
δ01i =
c(
2− δ01j
) and δ01j = c(1− δ01i pik + pik) .
If agent k is of type 1, that is, the highest value, then for every value of c and mixing
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probability pik by i, forming one link to i yields greater utility than forming zero links. To
see this, I calculate agent k’s incremental utility from forming one link to i rather than zero
links, using the fact that none of the other agents place positive weight on forming two links,
and the indifference conditions of agents i and j. Using these, one can be show that agent
k’s incremental utility from forming one link is
1
8pik
2 (1 + pik)
(−c
2
(−1 + pik)
2
(1 + pik) − 2
(
−1 − 3pik + 6pik
2
) (
−2 − 2pik +
√
c2 (−1 + pik)
2 + 4 (1 + pik)
2 − 4c (1 + pik)
2
)
+c
(
4 −
√
c2 (−1 + pik)
2 + 4 (1 + pik)
2 − 4c (1 + pik)
2 + pik
(
10 + pik
(
4 − 34pik +
√
c2 (−1 + pik)
2 + 4 (1 + pik)
2 − 4c (1 + pik)
2
)))
).
This expression is positive for all feasible pik and c less than 1. Agent k will prefer to deviate
and form a link to agent i, and complete the circle architecture, rather than form zero links.
Therefore, this cannot be an equilibrium.
Now suppose instead that agent j directs her single link to agent i, the mixing agent,
rather than to agent k. Agent i’s utility from forming a link to agent j is
θi − c + θi(1− δ02k δ12j ),
and her utility from forming a link to agent k is
θi − c + θi(1− δ02k δ01j ).
In order to mix between the two, she must be indifferent between them: This requires that
δ12j = δ
01
j , which contradicts the hypothesis that agent j places positive weight on forming
one link. Hence, this cannot be an equilibrium.
Step 6. Finally, I show that there cannot be an equilibrium in which only one agent
mixes, and is the only agent placing positive weight on forming one link. This will complete
the lemma.
To see this, first note that if agents j and k are not placing positive weight on forming
one link, then agent i must not place positive weight on forming two links. Otherwise, the
only solution to the indifference conditions for critical types of agent i would require that he
place zero weight on forming one link, contradicting the hypothesis that she forms one link.
To see this, note that the indifference conditions for the two cutoffs are identical.
δ01i =
c
δ02j δ
02
k
= δ12i ,
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Therefore, agent i cannot place any weight on forming 2 links in equilibrium. Now suppose
that agent j places positive weight on forming 2 links. This cannot be an equilibrium. To
see this, note the cutoff indifference conditions for agent i and agent j:
δ01i =
c
δ02j δ
02
k
, and δ02j =
2c
δ02k (1 + δ
01
i + pik − δ01i pik)
.
There are two candidate solutions to these equations. One requires that pik = −1, and cannot
be an equilibrium, while the other requires that δ01i = 1, which contradicts the hypothesis
that δ01i < 1. A similar calculation shows that agent k cannot place positive weight on two
links in equilibrium.
Hence, no agent can place positive weight on two links. It is easy to show now that there
is no equilibrium of this form at all. Such an equilibrium requires that δ01i = c. But then
both i and j would prefer to deviate and form links if their value θ is sufficiently high. For
example, if either agent has value θ = 1, then they strictly prefer to form two links rather
than zero.
This establishes that the only equilibria in which agents mix are the hybrid and mixing
equilibria. Therefore, for the following lemmas, assume that agents use only pure strategies.
Lemma 2 The only equilibrium in which every agent places positive weight on forming one
link, when there is no mixing, is the symmetric circle equilibrium.
Proof.
Step 1. I must first show that if each agent places positive weight on forming a single
link in equilibrium, then these links must be arranged in the the circle architecture. Suppose
that agent j is forming a link to agent k, who is forming a link to agent i. Agent i’s expected
utility from forming a link to j is
θ − c + (1− δ01j δ01k )θ.
Her expected utility from a single link to agent k is
θ − c+ (1− δ01j )θ.
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Since by hypothesis δ01k < 1, forming a single link to j is strictly preferred by agent i to
forming a single link to k. That is, she prefers to complete the circle.
Suppose next that agents j and and k each form a single link to one another. Then agent i
strictly prefers to link to whomever k is less likely to link. I have eliminated the cases where
i mixes, so suppose i links to j. Then by the argument above, this cannot be an equilibrium,
because k prefers to link to i and complete the circle, rather than link to j. Thus, the three
links must be arranged in a circle.
Step 2. I now show that that if all three agents place positive weight on forming a single
link, they must place zero weight on forming two links. Suppose not; let agent i put positive
weight on two links. Agent i’s indifference condition between forming one and two links at
her critical type is:
δ12i δ
01
k δ
01
j = c.
Consider now agent j’s indifference condition between forming zero and one link: Her critical
type:δ01j satisfies:
δ01j (δ
01
i (1− δ01k ) + 3δ01i δ01k + 2(1− δ12i − δ01k ) = c.
Together, these imply
(1− δ12i )(δ01i + 2(1− δ01k )) = 0.
This requires that either (1−δ12i ) = 0, which contradicts that agent i places positive weight on
two links, or (δ01i +2(1−δ01k )) = 0, which implies that either δ01i is negative, an impossibility,
or that δ01i = 0 and δ
01
k = 1. The former would give agent i negative utility for θ = 0, and the
latter contradicts the hypothesis that agent k puts positive weight on forming a single link.
Therefore, agent i could not have placed positive weight on forming a single link. Note that
this argument holds whether or not agents j and k were putting positive weight on forming
two links or not; therefore, by symmetry, no agent can put positive weight on forming two
links.
Step 3. Next, I show that when each agent places positive weight on forming a single
link, the cutoffs they use are the same: The equilibrium must be symmetric. Consider the
indifference cutoffs between forming 0 links and forming 1. The equilibrium cutoffs satisfy
the following system of equations
δ01i (δ
01
j + 2δ
01
k (1− δ01j )) = c,
δ01j (δ
01
k + 2δ
01
i (1− δ01k )) = c,
δ01k (δ
01
i + 2δ
01
j (1− δ01i )) = c.
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This system simplifies to the following system:
δ01j (δ
01
i + δ
01
k ) = 2δ
01
i δ
01
k ,
δ01k (δ
01
i + δ
01
j ) = 2δ
01
i δ
01
j .
Solving, eliminate δ01i and see that
δ01j = δ
01
k
.
= δ,
which immediately yields that δ01i = δ.
This shows that the symmetric circle equilibrium is the only architecture where agents do
not mix and each places positive weight on forming a single link.
Lemma 3 The only equilibrium in which two agents place positive weight on forming a
single link, when mixing is not allowed, is the periphery-sponsorship equilibrium.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let agents i and j be the those placing positive weight on
forming a single link. All 3 agents may or ma not be placing positive weight on 2 links. I
will show that the single links agents i and j are forming must both be to agent k. The other
possibilities are that one they link to each other, or they forming a line ending at agent k.
Step 1. The first case, when agents i and j are linking each other, I eliminate because
then both agents would prefer to deviate and link to agent k. To see this, consider agent i’s
expected utility from linking j in this case:
θi − c + (1− δ12j δ02k )θi.
Her expected utility from linking k is
θi − c + (1− δ01j δ02k )θi.
Since δ01j < δ
12
j , her expected utility from linking k is strictly greater than her expected
utility from linking j.
In the second case, suppose without loss of generality that i forms a single link to j, who
forms a single link to k. I first show that it cannot be that all three agents place positive
weight on forming two links. The argument is similar to those above. If they placed positive
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weight on two links, then the indifference condition between one link and two links, for agents
i and j, yields
δ12i δ
01
j δ
02
k = c,
δ12j δ
01
i δ
02
k = c.
The indifference condition between zero and one link for i and j yields
(2δ12j − δ01j )δ02k δ01i = c,
(δ01i − δ12i − δ01j + 2δ12j δ02k δ01j = c.
The indifference condition between 0 and 2 for agent k yields
δ02k δ
01
i δ
01
j = c.
In the solution of this system of equations, however, δ01i = δ
12
i , which contradicts our hy-
pothesis that agent i forms 1 link with positive probability.
Step 2. Suppose that only agents i and j place positive weight on two links. The
indifference conditions for the critical types of agents i and j yield the following system of
equations
(2δ12j − δ01j )δ01i = c,
δ12i δ
01
j = c,
δ12j δ
01
i = c,
(δ01i − δ12i − δ01j + 2δ12j )δ01j = c.
which again implies that δ01i = δ
12
i . Therefore, no agent can place positive weight on forming
two links. But then agent k strictly prefers to link to i and complete the circle if her θk value
exceeds
c
δ01i + 2δ
01
j − 2δ01i δ01j
,
which contradicts the hypothesis that only i and j form a single link.
Therefore, the links formed by agents i and j must both be to agent k. Again, suppose
that agents i and j place positive weight on forming two links. The indifference conditions
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of the criticals types, given by:
(δ01j δ
02
k − 2δ12j δ02k )δ01i = −c(δ12j δ02k )δ12i = c(δ01i δ02k − 2δ12i δ02k )δ01j = −c(δ12i δ02k )δ12j = c
imply that δ01i = δ
12
i , contradicting the hypothesis that agent i places positive weight on one
link. Therefore i and j must be forming only a single link.
If agent k places positive weight on two links, then agents i and j will place zero weight
on one link, which again contradicts the hypothesis. This follows from the indifference
conditions of the critical types for each agent:
(2− δ01j )δ02k δ01i = c
(2− δ01i )δ02k δ01j = c
(δ01i + δ
01
j )δ
02
k = 2c
If k does not form two links, she forms no links at all. Since agent i and j form only a single
link to k, the equilibrium is the periphery-sponsorship equilibrium.
Next, I eliminate the case where only one agent places positive weight on forming one link.
Lemma 4 There is no equilibrium where only one agent places positive weight on forming
one link.
Proof. Suppose not. Without loss of generality, let agent i link to agent j. Suppose also
that at least one of δ02k and δ
02
j is strictly less than one. The indifference conditions for agent
i imply
δ01i = δ
12
i =
c
δ02k δ
02
j
,
which contradicts the hypothesis that agent i places positive weight on forming one link. If
both δ02j and δ
02
k = 1, then whichever agent i does not form a link to receives zero utility, and
would therefore prefer to deviate and link to i or j if her value is sufficiently large. Hence,
this cannot be an equilibrium.
Finally, if any agent places positive weight on forming two links, without mixing, then it
must be a center-sponsorship equilibrium.
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Lemma 5 Suppose that no agent puts positive weight on forming one link, and agents do
not mix. Then the only equilibrium with this property is a center sponsored equilibrium with
one, two or three agents placing positive weight on forming two links.
Proof. First, it cannot be that no agent places positive weight on forming two links in
equilibrium; in this case the network would be empty, and agents with value above c would
prefer to deviate and form two links. Therefore, the only profiles to check are those with
one, two or three agents placing positive weight on two links.
All of these profiles are equilibria. The indifference conditions for agent i, for example,
show that if agents j and agent k place zero weight on one link, then i will never place weight
on 1 link in equilibrium, and will have the following cutoff between zero and two links:
δ02i =
c
δ02j δ
02
k
.
If δ02j = δ
02
k = 1, that is, if j and k form no links, then i links to both if her value is above c.
This is a one agent center-sponsorship equilibrium.
If δ02j δ
02
k = c, then i forms no links. This can occur if δ
02
j = δ
02
k =
√
c. This is a two agent
center-sponsorship equilibrium.
If δ02j δ
02
k < c and both are less than 1, then there is a three agent center sponsorship
equilibrium, where
δ02i = δ
02
j δ
02
k =
3
√
c.
This characterizes every possible equilibrium in the case with three agents, and completes
the proof of proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4
To show that this is an equilibrium, I will show that there are no profitable deviations; (1)
insiders must not wish to link to anyone when their value is below their cutoff θI , and must
wish to link to every insider when their value is above their cutoff. (2) Insiders must also
not wish to link to outsiders, no matter what other links they are forming, or what their
value is. (3) Outsiders must not wish to form links to anyone when their value is below their
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cutoff θO, and (4) outsiders must wish to form only a single link to a random insider when
their value is above their cutoff, and no other links.
Consider insiders first. The incremental value of a link to another insider, when not
forming any other links, is
F (θI)
|I|−1(θ +
n− |I|
|I| (1− F (θO))θ)− c
That is, with probability F (θI)
|I|−1 the insiders are not already fully connected, and in that
event, one additional link yields the value of an additional connection an insider, θ, and
potential a connected to outsiders connected to that insider. This has cost c. But by the
definition of θI , if θ < θI , this expression in negative. If θ < θI , from the definition of θI ,
F (θI)
|I|−1n− |I|
|I| (1− F (θO))− (1− F (θI)
|I|−1)((|I| − 1)θ + (n− 1)(1− F (θO))θ)
> (|I| − 1)(θ − c) + (n− |I|)(1− F (θO)),
Rearranging terms yields F (θI)
|I|−1(θ + n−|I||I| (1− F (θO))θ)− c < 0.
A link to another insider is not profitable when an insider’s value is below θI and she is
forming no other links. If she is forming links to outsiders, this incremental value is even
lower; she will already be receiving some of the value in the second term of the interior
expression above, so she is even less inclined to form links to other insiders.
The incremental value of a link to an outsider, when agent i is not herself already connected
to every insider is
F (θO)θ + (1− F (θO))(F (θI)|I|−1)(2θ + n− |I| − 1|I| (1− F (θO))θ)− c.
That is, if that outsider is not already linking to the insiders, she will receive θ. If that
outsider is forming a link, then there is an additional benefit from linking to her; you get
the value of the insider she is linking to, and any other outsiders that may be linking to that
insider. But by our hypothesis on c, this expression is also negative. If agent i is already
connecting the insiders herself, the incremental value of a link to an outsider is
F (θO)θ − c;
Only in the event that this outsider is not herself linking to some insider is there any incre-
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mental value in linking to her. This is also negative by the hypothesis on c.
An outsider must not wish to form any links when her value is below her cutoff θO. The
incremental value of a link to an insider is
F (θI)
|I|(θ +
n− |I| − 1
I
(1− F (θO))θ) + (1− F (θI)|I|)(|I|θ + (n− |I| − 1)(1− F (θO))θ)− c,
and by the definition of the outsider’s cutoff, this is negative if θ < θO, and positive if θ > θO.
If she is already forming a link to an insider, the incremental value of an additional link is
F (θI)
|I|(θ +
n− |I| − 1
|I| (1− F (θO))θ)− c;
Only if the set of insiders in not already connected is there any additional value in another
link to an insider. This is negative by our hypothesis on c.
The incremental value to an outsider of a link to another outsider, when the agent is not
already linking to the insiders, is
θ + (1− F (θO))(θ + F (θI)|I|((|I| − 1)θ+
(n− |I| − 2)(1− F (θO))θ) + (1− F (θI)|I|)n− |I| − 2|I| (1− F (θO))θ)− c.
This link has value if the outsider selected is not already linked to any insiders, or if she
is, then only if the set of insiders is not being connected any any insider, and the outsider
selected is not already linking to same insider as this outsider is herself connected to. This
is clearly less that simply connecting to the insider directly; In the event that this link to an
outsider has value, a link to an additional insider has greater value. The incremental value
when already linked to the inside is
F (θO)θ + (1− F (θO))F (θI)|I| |I| − 1|I| θ − c,
which is negative by the hypothesis on c. Thus, this profile of strategies is a Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium.
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Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose the other agents follow s(θ), and form 0 links if θ < θI , and n − 1 links if θ ≥ θI .
Consider the payoff to agent i of forming s links. In the event that someone else has formed
n−1 links, agent i’s payoff is (n−1)θi−sc. This event occurs with probability (1−F (θI)n−1).
If all other agents form zero links, then her payoff is sθi−sc, and this occurs with probability
F (θI)
n−1. Her expected payoff is therefore
(1− F (θI)n−1)(n− 1)θi + F (θI)n−1sθi − sc.
Only the last two terms depend on s, so the agent must maximize only
sF (θI)
n−1θi − sc = s(F (θI)n−1θi − c).
This is positive if
θi >
c
F (θI)n−1
,
in which case, the maximizing choice of s is n − 1, the largest number of links possible. If
it is negative, the maximizing choice of s is 0. Therefore, agent i’s best response is a cutoff
rule, with cutoff c
F (θI)n−1
. Any agent with type θ < c
F (θI)n−1
will form 0 links, and any agent
with type θ > c
F (θI)n−1
will form n− 1 links. Recall that
F (θI)
n−1θI = c −→ F (θI)n−1 = c
θI
,
so that the cutoff rule used by agent i is
c
F (θI)n−1
=
c
c
θI
= θI .
Thus, it is a best response for agent i to use the same cutoff rule being used by the other
n − 1 agents, θI , and {s, . . . ,s} is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, as was to be
shown.
87
Proof of Corollary 2
First, consider agent k, the center of the star. The payoff to agent k of forming a link is
θkF (θ
n−1
O )− c.
This is the probability that the agent is not already forming a link to her, minus the cost of
the link c. This is positive if θk >
c
F (θn−1
O
)
. From the definition of θn−1O ,
F (θn−1O ) =
(n− 1)θn−1O − c
(n− 2)θn−1O
,
and by hypothesis
c ≥ (n− 1)θ
n−1
O
(n− 2)θn−1O + 1
.
Substituting,
c
F (θn−1O )
> 1.
But since θk ∈ [0, 1], it is impossible that θk > 1. Thus forming a link is never profitable for
agent k, so she forms none, exactly as called for in strategy profile b.
For agents i 6= k, first examine the incentive to form a single link to agent k. The expected
utility from doing so is
θi(1 + (n− 2)(1− F (θn−1O )))− c, (A.2)
and this is positive only if θi > θ
n−1
O . The value of each link in addition to a link to the
center agent k is
θiF (θ
n−1
O )− c.
The argument above shows that this is negative. Therefore a single link to agent k dominates
forming zero links, and forming a link to k and any number of links to other agents besides
k. Finally, forming any number of links without a link to agent k is dominated by a single
link to k. The expected utility of forming l links to agents j 6= k is
lθi + (1− F (θn−1O )l)(1 + (n− 2− l)(1− F (θn−1O )))θi − lc. (A.3)
The first term is the directly utility from l connections, the second term is the expected
utility from an indirect link to k, and the third term is the cost of link. The difference
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(A.2)-(A.3)
(A.2)− (A.3) =
c(l − 1) + θi
(
(n− 1− l)(1− F (θn−1O )F (θn−1O )l + F (θn−1O )(l − F (θn−1O )l) > 0.
Therefore, the utility of a single link to k dominates all other actions, if and only if θi > θ
n−1
O .
Agent i therefore follows precisely the equilibrium strategy sO.
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of the proposition follows exactly the argument in the proof of proposition 1. An
agent’s expected utility from contributing bi in the contribution game is
(1− F (θI)n−1)θi + F (θI)n−11{bi>k}θibi.
Her best response is to contribute K if her value θi > θI , and contribute 0 if her values is
below θI .
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof of the second part of the theorem follows the argument above, with the only
difference being that she can only choose to indicate willingness to pay or not; she does
not have all the alternative actions available in the network formation game. Her expected
utility is
1{di=1}(θi −
K
(1 + (n− 1)(1− F (θnO)))
).
Her best response is to signal willingness to pay if her value θi > θ
n
O, and to not signal
willingness to pay if θi > θ
n
O.
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Proof of Proposition 7
First, note that under the partial order a < a′ if µ(a) < µ(a′), the functions h and g are
order preserving. Next calculate g(SI(θ, h(c, n))).
g(sI(θi)) =
{
µ({0}n−1)c = 0, if θi ≤ θI ;
µ({1}n−1)c = (n− 1)c θi > θI ,
and applying h, (h2(n) − 1)h1(c) = K. Furthermore, under the image of h, the cutoff θI
in the center-sponsorship equilibrium is the same as the cutoff in the contribution game.
Therefore, g(sI(θi, h(θ, c, n)) = t(θ), which is an equilibrium of the contribution game.
Proof of Proposition 8
For h and g to be order preserving, consider a different order on A. Let a < a′ if and only
if aik < a
′
ik. Then h and g are order preserving. Then g(sO(θi, h(θ, c, n)) = r(θ), which is an
equilibrium of the voluntary cost sharing mechanism.
Proof of proposition 9.
If costs are 0, it is clearly dominant to link to all of your peers. Likewise, if costs are
sufficiently large, it is dominant to form no links. All that remains is to show that these are
the only possible configurations an agent’s single link choices may following in equilibrium.
There are four possibilities; zero agents form a single link, one agents does, two agents do,
or all three agents do. We can immediate eliminate the possibility only one agent does. To
see this, let agent i link to agent j in equilibrium, and neither either j nor k form a single
link in equilibrium. That at some cost c, agent j must be indifferent between forming two
links and forming none,since equilibria are cutoff rules. But this can only be if the benefit
the first and second link are equal; otherwise for a slightly lower cost, she will strictly prefer
to form one link, a contradiction. But these expected values cannot be equal, because agent
j has a higher probability of being already connected to agent i through i’s single link, and
so j will strictly prefer to link to k than to i. Thus, this cannot be an equilibrium.
The case where no agents form a single link is the center-sponsorship equilibrium. The
only equilibrium in which only two agents form a single link is the periphery-sponsorship
equilibrium. To see that no other configuration in which two agents form a single link may
be an equilibrium, consider the alternative possibilities; either two agents form a single link
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to one another, while the third does not, or else two agents form links in a line, ending at
the third agent, who does not form a link. In the first case, the third agent would wish to
form a single link to the other two for an intermediate range of costs; the marginal benefit
of a single link to one of them is sufficiently high. In the second case, the third agent in
the line would wish to form a single link to complete the circle. In both cases the private
cost at which agents wish top form two links is lower than the private cost at which it is
better to form one link, rather than zero; that is, these agents will deviate from the putative
equilibrium. The only possibility is the periphery-sponsorship equilibrium.
The case where are all three form a single link is either the circle equilibrium, the full
mixing equilibrium or the hybrid equilibrium. To see that no other configuration can be an
equilibrium when all three agents form a single link, consider the alternative possibilities.
We first eliminate the possibilities that only two agents mix. We next show that if no agents
mix, it must be the circle equilibrium, if one agent mixes it must be the hybrid equilibrium,
and if all three agents mix it must be the full mixing equilibrium.
It cannot be that two agents mix in forming their single link, because to do so they must
be indifferent between linking to an agent who is mixing, and one who is not. Because these
two agents will be connected to her with different probabilities, she will strictly prefer to
link to the agent she is less likely to be connected to, and thus cannot mix.
If no agents mix, then the equilibrium architecture must be the circle, if all three agent
form a single link with positive probability. For, suppose not: The only other possibility is
that two agents form their single link to one another, and the third links to one of them.
This cannot be an equilibrium; the agent who is not linked by the third agent will strictly
prefer to deviate and link to to the third agent, rather than link to the third agents “target.”
This is because she is already likely to be linked to the third agent’s target, and less likely
to be linked to the third agent, and she will prefer to link to the agent she is less likely to
be connected to.
If one agent mixes, it must be the hybrid equilibrium. The only other possibilities is that
the agents being linked by the mixer do not form their links to one another, but either
form both to the mixer, or form a line ending at the mixer. The former case cannot be an
equilibrium. To see this, note that the agents linking the mixer will actually prefer to link to
the other insider, rather than the mixer. This is because the mixer is already linking to her
with positive probability, and the other insider is not. The latter cannot be an equilibrium
either, because the mixer will not be indifferent between linking the two insiders; she will
prefer to link the agent who is not linking her.
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Finally, if all three agents mix, it must be the full mixing equilibrium. We need only show
that all three agents must form their single link to the other agents with equal probability,
and that they all use the same equilibrium cutoff. This will be implied by the the mixing
indifference condition; in order for any agent to be willing to mix, she must be indifferent
between linking to either of the other two. If all three agents mix, then they must all be
using the same strategy, and linking to one another with equal probability.
Proof of proposition 11.
It is clear that the expected value of the public good each agent expects to receive is higher
the more links she forms. By the concavity of the utility function, this implies she will invest
less.
Proof of proposition 12.
To show that for the center-sponsorship equilibrium there is a critical k above which yLowi
is 0, we write out an agent’s optimization problem, given optimal play by his two peers, and
the indifference condition that characterizes cI :
max
y
ULow(y, ylow, c)
s.t.
U ′Low(ylow, y, c) = 0
U ′High(yhigh, y, c) = 0
U ′Low(ylow, y, cI) = U
′
High(yhigh, y, cI)
y ≥ 0
This states that given if yLowi and y
High
i are chosen optimally by an agent’s peers, their first
order conditions will be satisfied with equality, and cI will be defined by their indifference
condition. At the critical k, yLowi = 0 will satisfy the low agent’s first order condition exactly.
We will check that when yLowi = 0 is the optimal choice for other agents when their cost of
linking is low, then y=0 is the best response. The agent’s lagrangian is given by
L = ULow(y)−λ1y−λ2U ′Low(yLowi , y, c)−λ3U ′High(yHighi , y, c)−λ4(U ′Low(yLowi , y, cI)−U ′High(yHighi , y, cI))
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The taking derivatives with respect to the agent’s choice, y, the first order condition is
U ′Low(y, 0, c)−λ1−λ2U ′′Low(0, y, c)−λ3U ′′High(yHighi , y, c)−λ4(U ′′High(yHighi , y, cI)−U ′′Low(0, y, cI)) = 0
We suppose that when ylow = 0, y = 0 is the optimal choice; that is, y = 0 satisfies this
equation. But note that
U ′′Low(0, 0, cI) > 0,
U ′′High(0, 0, cI) > 0.
From the presumed optimality of the other agent’s choices. Thus the first order condition of
the problem reduces to
−λ1 − λ2U ′′Low(0, 0, c)− λ3U ′′High(0, 0, c)− λ4(U ′′High(yHighi , y, cI)− U ′′Low(0, y, cI)) = 0
Which implies that
λ1 = −λ2U ′′Low(0, 0, c)− λ3U ′′High(0, 0, c)− λ4(U ′′High(yHighi , y, cI)− U ′′Low(0, y, cI)) > 0
The last inequality follows because λ2, λ3 and λ4 are positive, since we suppose that each
agent’s first order condition holds exactly, and U” is strictly negative, due to the concavity
assumptions of u. Therefore, the nonnegativity constraint on y binds, and we have verified
that y = yLowi = 0 is an equilibrium at this critical k. Due to the concavity assumptions
on U, this is a global optimum. This method extends to the calculation of k∗ is every other
equilibrium, because it will always be the case that every other investment level is positive
at the critical k∗.
Proof of Proposition 10.
This is apparent from the fact that yHighi > y
Mid
i > y
Low
i , and inspection of the indifference
conditions that determine the linking cutoffs.
Proof of Proposition 13.
To start, consider the periphery sponsorship, where the center agent invests yHighCenter when
forming no links, and the outside agents invest yHighi when forming no links. The cutoffs
used by the outsiders are given by cLow and cHigh, while the single cutoff used by the insider
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is given by cI . To see that y
Mid
i is always positive, suppose not. If this is the case, then
certainly yLowi = 0 for every agent. Consider the first order condition of the outsider who is
forming no links and of the outsider connecting to the insider.
F (cLow)(1− F (cI))u′(y + yHighCenter)+ (A.4)
((1− F (cLow))(1− F (cI)) + F (cI)F (cHigh))u′(y) + (1− F (cHigh))F (cI)u′(y + yh)− k,
(A.5)
(1− F (cI))u′(y + yHighCenter)+
F (cI)F (c
High)u′(y) + (1− F (cHigh))F (cI)u′(y + yh)− k.
(A.6)
The only difference between the outsider forming a link to the center at the agent who does
not do so, is a higher probability of receiving the investment undertaken by the center. This
has an additional (1 − F (cLow))(1− F (cI)) for the agent who links to the center. The first
order condition of the insider who forms no links is given by
2F (cLow)(1− F (cHigh))u′(y + yHighi ) + (1− 2F (cLow)(1− f3)u′(y)− k (A.7)
These are all linear combinations of the marginal utility of investment when connected to
one or more of an agent’s peers. Because yHighi and y
High
Center are positive, equations A.7 and
A.5 are equal to zero at the choices yHighi and y
High
Center:
F (cLow)(1− F (cI))u′(yHighCenter + yHighi )+ (A.8)
(F (cLow)F (cI) + (1− F (cLow))(1− F (cI)))u′(yh) + (1− F (cHigh))F (cI)u′(2yh) = k (A.9)
2F (cLow)(1− F (cHigh))u′(yHighCenter + yHighi )+ (A.10)
(1− 2F (cLow)(1− F (cHigh)))u′(ych) = k (A.11)
We can solve for u′(yHighi + y
High
Center) in each equation, and set them equal, to find
k − (1− 2F (cLow)(1− F (cHigh)))u′(yHighCenter)
2F (cLow)(1− F (cHigh)) =
k − (F (cI)F (cHigh) + (1− F (cLow))(1− F (cI)))u′(yHighi )− (1− F (cHigh))F (cI)u′(2yHighi )
F (cLow)(1− F (cI))
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Isolating k, we substitute this into the marginal utility of the agent linking the insider.
Evaluating this at y = 0, we should have that marginal utility is negative. Otherwise, the
agent will wish to make a positive investment. With this substitution, equation A.6 can be
rewritten as
F (cHigh)F (cI)u
′(0) + (1− F (cHigh))F (cI)u′(yHighi )
+
2F (cI)F (c
High)2 + 4F (cLow)F (cHigh)− 4F (cLow)F (cI)F (cHigh)
1− 2F (cHigh) + F (cI) u
′(yHighCenter)
+
2F (cI)F (c
High)− 4F (cHigh)− F (cI)2 − 4F (cLow) + 4F (cLow)F (cI)− 3F (cI) + 4
1− 2F (cHigh) + F (cI) u
′(yHighCenter)
− ( 2(1 − F (c
High))2F (cI)
(1 − 2F (cHigh) + F (cI)) )u
′(2yHighi ).
Notice that the marginal utility in the negative is smaller in magnitude than the marginal
utilities in the positive terms. Furthermore, the weight on the positives is to be greater than
the weight on the negative term. Therefore, marginal utility at 0 is positive for the agent
linking the center, and this cannot be an equilibrium.
This argument can be extended to every equilibrium structure, because when agents link-
ing the center do not link, differences between the networks disappear; in each equilibrium,
marginal utility will have the above form, and the same argument may be applied.
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